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PCR METHODS FOR PATHOGEN DETECTION 
 
Catherine Adria Hardison, M.S. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
 
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a renewed focus on the security of vital infrastructure, 
such as wastewater treatment and collection systems.  Terrorism, combined with the potential 
destruction in the wake of natural disasters, has led to an all hazards approach when evaluating 
contaminants that could be introduced into a wastewater treatment and collection system either 
accidentally or intentionally. 
Prioritization is an evaluation technique that can prove useful to wastewater treatment 
plants (WWTPs) in providing a list of contaminants that would cause the most deleterious effects 
to the plant and its surrounding area.  A framework was developed to focus on four endpoints 
that would be of the greatest concern to WWTPs.  It was applied to 78 contaminants, including 
biological agents, flammable chemicals, radioactive elements and decontamination agents.  
Those contaminants having the highest weighted score for each endpoint were considered the 
greatest threat to the physical treatment plant and its unit processes, the plant’s workers, and 
human and animal populations in contact with its receiving waters.   
The prioritization process can provide utilities with information on which contaminants 
should be screened for throughout the plant and collection system.  One such method for 
biological agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, is real-time, rapid cycle polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR).  This rapid analytical technique allows for preliminary detection of pathogen presence in 
a much shorter time than is required for bacteria culturing.  PCR used jointly with a field 
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concentration method greatly improved the sensitivity of the screening process, with a detection 
limit of 20 cfu/mL in concentrated secondary effluent, as compared to 3.50 x 103 cfu/mL in the 
unconcentrated sample.  The detection limits of Salmonella typhimurium exceeded that expected 
from volume reduction with log recoveries of 3.53 and 2.24 compared to theoretical log 
recoveries of 2.40 and 2.10 for river water and secondary effluent, respectively.  PCR cannot be 
applied for Brucella spp. screening due to cross-reactions with other bacteria present within the 
wastewater system, but for other pathogens, PCR may be a viable option for screening in treated 
and untreated wastewater. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The events of September 11, 2001 have led to a heightened sense of need for security within the 
United States.  The protection of buildings and infrastructure elements, in addition to human life, 
are of the utmost importance, the most critical of which are potable water treatment, storage, and 
distribution systems, and wastewater collection and treatment systems.  To this end, a drinking 
water component was incorporated into PL 107-188, the “Public Health and Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act,” passed by Congress in June 2002.  In addition, 
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) was issued in January 2004.  It 
established a national policy for the defense of agricultural, food, and water systems (both 
drinking water and wastewater) in the United States against terrorist attacks and other 
emergencies.  These proclamations provided the environmental science and engineering 
community with a public and Federal mandate to develop and design analytical techniques and 
integrated physical protection systems to protect water and wastewater infrastructure systems 
against intentional contamination, damage, and destruction. 
 Terrorism is not the only concern for defense against contamination events.  An all 
hazards approach has been developed to take into account natural disasters, whose aftermath can 
pose a serious risk to the infrastructure of a community, as seen with Hurricane Katrina.  
Wastewater treatment plants can be put out of commission by these events, and once brought 
online again, these facilities may have to deal with large amounts of contamination due to runoff 
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and flooding.  These incidents may require an immediate emergency response to rapidly analyze 
for possible contaminants within the system. 
Accordingly, a research project was developed to provide high quality information for 
municipal wastewater collection and treatment facilities and to help them better prepare to safely 
respond to, remediate, and recover from intentional and accidental contamination events.  This 
analysis also extends to secondary contamination that may result from other acts of intentional 
contamination not focused on wastewater systems.  An example would be decontamination water 
generated by cleanup efforts at intentionally contaminated buildings.  This overall goal was 
divided into the following specific objectives: 
• Identify contaminants that would be of concern for public and worker health, process upset, 
physical damage or destruction of wastewater infrastructure, and pass through to the 
environment; 
• Develop methods that address the fate, transport, and removal of these contaminants in 
typical municipal wastewater treatment plants; 
• Assess practical and currently available technologies that could be used to detect, remove, 
degrade, or inactivate contaminants; 
• Evaluate and compile available data to determine and prioritize critical areas of uncertainty; 
and 
• Address these areas of uncertainty by developing guidance for emergency operating 
procedures, treatment process modifications, and potentially new treatment technologies. 
The research described herein is based on the objectives discussed above and will 
specifically address: 
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• The application of a prioritization framework to contaminants to determine those that would 
be of the greatest interest to municipal wastewater treatment plants; 
• An assessment (Phase I) of raw water, finished drinking water, and following various stages 
of treatment, wastewater to screen for viruses, neurotoxins, and pathogenic bacteria and 
protozoa using real-time, rapid cycle PCR.  These tests would be used to determine any 
background interferences in the water samples of interest; 
• A determination of the detection limits (Phase II) of the R.A.P.I.D.® PCR using samples 
spiked with Salmonella typhimurium by comparing PCR results with traditional plate 
culturing techniques; 
• The use of a concentration method (Phase III) to evaluate the R.A.P.I.D.® PCR with respect 
to Salmonella recovery and improved detection limits. 
Although there have been no documented incidents of intentional contamination of 
wastewater treatment plants and collection systems in connection with terrorism, the possibility 
of a terrorist attack still exists.  There have been numerous accidental and intentional discharges 
that have caused significant damage to municipal wastewater treatment plants and their 
collection systems.  These events can be used as a basis for what could potentially happen if a 
contamination incident, whether direct or secondary, were to occur.  The threat of terrorism, 
combined with the potential destruction caused by natural disasters, has made it necessary to 
provide utilities with a prioritization protocol to determine which contaminants would be of the 
greatest threat to wastewater collection and treatment systems.  This assessment will aid in the 
development of reliable rapid screening procedures for those contaminants of interest.  The 
screening will then provide wastewater facilities with preliminary data to take the appropriate 
measures for risk assessment and operational responses.  
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
To assess the viability of rapid analytical methods for wastewater, an evaluation of potential 
security issues regarding wastewater was performed.  A number of rapid analytical techniques 
exist for possible use in contaminant detection:  rapid immunoassays, rapid enzyme tests, and 
field real-time, rapid cycle PCR for pathogen detection, and field gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometry for the detection of volatile organic chemicals.  The research presented herein will 
focus on rapid polymerase chain reaction and its feasibility in detecting pathogenic contaminants 
in wastewater.  Salmonella typhimurium is used as a model bacterium for assessing detection 
ability and limits in these experiments.  
2.1 WASTEWATER SECURITY ISSUES 
The likelihood of an attack on a wastewater collection system and treatment plant is minimal.  
However, the USA PATRIOT Act has defined critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (Office of Homeland 
Security).  Since public utilities are a vital component of a community’s infrastructure, the result 
of such an attack would have a severe impact on public perception and could be detrimental to 
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the surrounding community.  The destruction of other infrastructure components, such as 
roadways and drinking water treatment and distribution systems, may cause more fear within the 
public, making them more desirable targets.  However, if a wastewater collection and treatment 
system were destroyed or needed to be taken offline due to accidental or intentional 
contamination, daily activities, such as taking showers and using the bathroom, would be 
disrupted, and basic household chores like washing clothes and cleaning dishes could not be 
performed. 
Contamination of wastewater collection and treatment facilities and the potential 
disruption of treatment processes may not be the direct public health threat that drinking water 
treatment contamination would be, but the consequences could be just as dire.  Instead of a single 
outcome that far outweighs other possible outcomes, as with drinking water and public health, 
there are four endpoints that would have equal weighting with respect to a wastewater 
contamination event.  For example, if the contaminated effluent were released into receiving 
waters, downstream drinking water treatment facilities may be affected.  The recreational use of 
the receiving waters may be seriously compromised, and there could be potential negative effects 
on the flora and fauna of the receiving waters and surrounding riparian areas.  The health of 
workers at the treatment plant can be compromised by the release of volatile chemicals into the 
air.  Unit processes can be disrupted, causing sewage to remain untreated and released into 
receiving waters, causing further environmental damage.  Physical damage and destruction of the 
treatment plant and collection system would also be of concern due to flammable chemicals 
causing explosions.  Other contaminants can also remain within the infrastructure, requiring 
significant remediation efforts. 
 5 
Contamination can result from a direct attack on the wastewater collection and treatment 
system.  An attack of this nature would be the most damaging and destructive attack on a 
wastewater treatment system, but also the least plausible.  A far more probable scenario is the 
contamination of wastewater treatment plants due to the flushing of contaminated drinking water 
systems or the decontamination of buildings, as with the anthrax attacks on the Senate buildings 
in 2001.  Biological agents may be assimilated into activated sludge flocs; radioactive elements 
may remain in the sludge of primary and secondary treatment; and flammable chemicals that can 
be metabolized by bacteria during secondary treatment may pose as a fire and explosion hazard 
or employee health risk by being volatilized during aeration.  Other nonflammable chemical 
agents may adhere to the infrastructure of the wastewater treatment plant components.  Another 
possibility is the use of decontamination chemicals to treat other chemical and biological agent 
attacks that find their way to the wastewater treatment plant via drainage systems.  Little is 
known of the fate and transport of these chemicals in wastewater processes, but due to the 
disinfecting nature of these substances, the effects on biological treatment processes may cause 
the treatment plant to become nonfunctional.  They may also be highly corrosive, causing 
damage to infrastructure components. 
Several incidents where harmful chemicals have entered wastewater treatment plants and 
their collection systems have been documented in the last 30 years.  While they are not classified 
as terrorist attacks, they provide an example of what may happen when a contaminant is released 
into a wastewater treatment system. 
The Hexa-Octa Incident in 1977 began with the intentional dumping of toxic chemicals 
in a manhole and would end up setting a legal precedent in the United States 
(Louisville/Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District).  Employees at the Morris Forman 
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treatment plant in Louisville, Kentucky, noticed a noxious chemical odor that was coming from 
the plant.  After an investigation of over a week, it was determined that the offending chemicals 
were hexachloropentadiene (Hexa) and octachlorocyclopentene (Octa), two highly toxic 
substances used in the manufacturing of pesticides.   This discovery resulted in the shutting down 
of the treatment plant for three months, and over 100 million gallons of raw sewage were 
released directly into the river each day.  The sewer lines responsible for carrying the waste to 
the treatment plant took another two years to remediate, requiring the raw sewage carried by 
them to be diverted away from the treatment plant and discharged directly in the river. 
The source of the contamination was traced to a local chemical disposal company, whose 
employees dumped the waste down a manhole.  Subsequently, the president of the company and 
two of its employees were charged and eventually found guilty of polluting a waterway.  The 
originators of the waste later agreed to compensate the local sewer district for costs associated 
with sewer and treatment plant cleanup and employee medical care.  
A 1981 incident in Louisville, Kentucky led to extensive damage to the city’s wastewater 
collection system, resulting in millions of dollars of repairs to the sewer lines and subsequent 
damage of streets and buildings.  A spark from a car caused an explosion that rippled through 
two miles of road, damaging the surface and leaving large craters in place of manholes.  The 
source of the explosion was traced to a soybean processing plant that spilled thousands of gallons 
of hexane, a highly flammable solvent, into the sewer lines.  The resulting vapor mixture was 
within the limits to be explosive, and the spark from the car was just the ignition source needed 
to cause the explosion.  Repairs to the sewer lines took about 20 months to complete, while work 
on the damage to surrounding streets and buildings took several additional months.  While the 
chemical release was accidental, the company responsible for the spill pled guilty to four counts 
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of violating environmental laws, paid its fine, and later, agreed to pay damages to the sewer 
district. 
In April 1992, another sewer explosion, in Guadalajara, Mexico, was the result of pipe 
corrosion (Suburban Emergency Management Project).  A previously installed water pipeline 
leaked onto a gasoline line that lay underneath.  The corrosion of the gasoline line allowed 
vapors to accumulate in the sewers.  Nine separate explosions occurred throughout the city, 
killing 206 and injuring 1,460 others.  The blasts also damaged 1,148 buildings. 
More recently, in June 2006, a release of 25 gallons of potassium thiocyanate into a 
Philadelphia sewer system led to fish kills downstream of the discharge of the wastewater 
treatment plant and the closure of the city’s drinking water intake valves (Bauers 2006).  The 
chemical, commonly used in the development of vaccines and antibiotics, was traced to Merck & 
Co., Inc.  However, due to its hazardous nature, it should not have been released into the sewers.  
A day after the release, the receiving treatment plant, Upper Gwynedd Township Wastewater 
Treatment Plant, noticed fluctuations in the chlorine levels in the discharge.  Numbers of dead 
fish were later noticed downstream of the effluent outlet.  Due to these events, testing was 
performed and showed that a cyanide compound was present in the waters.  It was thought that 
the potassium thiocyanate reacted with the chlorine used during disinfection to create cyanogen 
chloride, a chemical that is highly toxic to fish. 
These incidents are examples of what may happen if an accidental or intentional 
contamination event occurred.  The health of the treatment plant’s workers may be in jeopardy; 
components of the treatment plant and collection system may be destroyed; treatment processes 
may deviate from typical conditions; and flora and fauna may suffer in the event of contaminant 
pass through.  The research presented herein focuses on developing a prioritization score for 
 8 
potential wastewater contaminants evaluated at each of these endpoints.   The results of the 
prioritization can then help municipal wastewater authorities determine which contaminants 
would be the most dangerous if introduced into a wastewater treatment facility or collection 
system.  To this end, effective and rapid screening procedures are needed in the event of 
accidental, intentional or secondary contamination.  Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is one 
method that can characterize the presence of target pathogenic material in a sample and can be 
used in the event of suspected biocontamination. 
2.2 POLYMERASE CHAIN REACTION 
Polymerase chain reaction is a molecular biology technique that allows for the replication 
and amplification of a specific DNA sequence.  Developed in 1983 by Kary Mullis, this method 
is now commonly used in cloning, DNA sequencing, the tracking of genetic disorders, and 
forensic analysis (Nelson and Cox 2005).  The technology of PCR is based on the premise that 
every living organism has its own unique genomic sequence made up of nucleotides.  These 
nucleotide sequences may have many similarities, as is the case with Salmonella typhimurium 
and Escherichia coli, which are 60-70% identical on the DNA level (Bej et al. 1994; Maloy and 
Edwards).  To use PCR to detect a specific DNA sequence, shorter sequences known as primers 
need to be designed so that there are enough nucleotide mismatches with other DNA sequences 
that may be present within a sample.  Primers consist of 18 to 28 nucleotides that are 
complementary to sequences on either side of the target DNA (Bitton 2005).  Their proper design 
can ensure the selectivity of the PCR process.  The nucleotide mismatches will prevent DNA 
polymerase from extending the whole DNA sequence even if there is a single base pair 
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mismatch.  Environmental analysis applications include the detection and identification of 
specific bacteria in wastewater and sludges and the tracking of genetically engineered 
microorganisms used in bioremediation processes.  It can also detect foodborne and waterborne 
pathogens and viruses in many environments. 
There are three steps which form a single cycle of PCR.  DNA denaturation occurs as the 
temperature is increased and allows the DNA to uncoil and separate into two strands by breaking 
the hydrogen bonds between base pairs.  The temperature is then decreased, which causes the 
synthetic primers to anneal to either side of the target DNA sequence.  The primers serve as a 
starting point for the DNA polymerase, resulting in the replication, or extension, of the desired 
DNA sequence.  Extension is performed by Taq polymerase, a thermostable enzyme that is 
extracted from bacteria that live in hot springs (Bitton 2005).  It is able to withstand the high 
temperatures required for DNA denaturation without denaturing itself.  The result is the 
amplification of the target DNA, and the cycle is repeated. 
The cycling of the denaturing, annealing, and extending steps is automated by using a 
thermocycler, which controls the temperature required for each of these steps.  Typically, the 
PCR process is run for 30 cycles lasting about 3 hours.  An entire PCR run results in the 
exponential accumulation of the target DNA.  The PCR products can then be analyzed using gel 
electrophoresis, which can determine the size and purity of the amplicon. 
The PCR method is highly sensitive; only one piece of the target DNA is necessary for 
proper amplification resulting in billions of copies at the end of the process.  While it can detect 
the presence of an organism within a sample, it cannot determine the viability of an organism as 
DNA does not readily degrade after death.  This fact is important to note, because the 
confirmation of a pathogen’s presence may be the result of residual DNA from non-viable 
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organisms.  Contamination is also a possibility with PCR, because it is not a closed system.  The 
reaction products must be directly applied to the gel electrophoresis to be analyzed. 
In the event of wastewater system contamination, time is of the essence.  Traditional PCR 
methods may not be suitable for field applications, and the time required to perform conventional 
PCR may not be quick enough when trying to mitigate the effects of contamination.  Advances 
have been made in PCR technology, which allow for shorter cycles and contained product 
analysis.  Thermocyclers using this real-time, rapid cycle PCR technology have also been 
developed for use in the field. 
2.3 REAL-TIME RAPID CYCLE PCR 
Real-time rapid cycle PCR is based on the technology of traditional PCR, but as the name 
suggests, the cycles are shorter, and PCR product analysis occurs during the reaction.  Reactions 
are performed in glass capillary tubes that have a high surface area-to-volume ratio, so that quick 
temperature changes are possible.  A typical cycle time for rapid cycle PCR ranges from 20 to 60 
seconds (Wittwer 2001).  The temperature is quickly ramped up and down, and then held briefly, 
allowing all three steps to occur simultaneously.  This temperature profile is in contrast to 
conventional PCR methods where the temperature is held for each step, so that thermal 
equilibrium is reached. 
During sample preparation, fluorescent dyes are added that may be attached to probes or 
primers.  Some dyes may also attach to the PCR product itself (Saunders 2004).   The fluorescent 
dyes are specific to the target DNA sequence, and the strength of the fluorescent signal is 
dependent on the amount of amplicon within the capillary tube.  The amplicons within the 
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capillary tube are constantly monitored during cycling by measuring the product’s fluorescence 
after extension.  The strength of the fluorescent signal can aid in quantifying the amount of 
template DNA in the sample. 
The set-up for real-time, rapid cycle PCR is similar to conventional PCR systems in that a 
thermocycler is used to control the temperature profiles required for cycling.  The optics 
integrated into the thermocycler for real-time, rapid cycle PCR emit a light source for dye 
excitation and have the ability to collect the resulting fluorescent emissions (Logan and Edwards 
2004).  Data acquisition and analysis is provided by a computer connected to the thermocycler.  
The capillaries in which the PCR process takes place are a closed system.  Amplification and 
fluorescent detection take place within the reaction vessel, requiring no post-PCR manipulations 
(e.g., gel electrophoresis) and thereby prevents the many possible sources of contamination. 
The R.A.P.I.D.® (Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device) Cycler is a 
militarized version of the LightCycler, one of the first real-time PCR platforms made for 
commercial use.  Air is used as the heating and cooling medium.  The samples are more 
uniformly heated and cooled, speeding up the PCR process; a run of 40 cycles takes about 30 
minutes to complete (Saunders 2004).  The light source for the system is a single blue light 
emitting diode (LED).  The light emitted from the excited fluorophores is collected in three 
discrete channels.  These channels are able to detect emitted light at varying wavelengths. 
The R.A.P.I.D.® system makes use of hybridization probes for detection of target DNA 
sequences.  Two probes are designed to recognize and attach to internal sequences within 
amplified DNA.  One probe is labeled at the 3’-end with fluorescein, a fluorescence resonance 
energy transfer (FRET) donor.  The other probe has LC-Red 640, a FRET acceptor, attached at 
the 5’-end.  The number in the dye name (e.g. LC-Red 640 and LC-Red 705) corresponds to the 
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wavelength emitted by the dye when excited.  The 3’-end is modified by phosphorylation to 
prevent extension.  During hybridization, the probes come into close proximity of one other.  
When fluorescent energy is present, the fluorescein transfers energy to the LC-Red 640, resulting 
in a signal that can be detected by the optics of the R.A.P.I.D.® Cycler.  This is then compared to 
signals from positive and negative control samples to determine the presence of the desired DNA 
sequence in unknown samples. 
To ensure the PCR process runs smoothly, additional reagents must be added during 
sample preparation.  Bovine serum albumin, or BSA, is used to ensure that the DNA does not 
adhere to the sides of the glass capillaries.  It also aids in stabilizing the enzyme (Innis and 
Gelfand 1990).  To guarantee adequate extension by the Taq polymerase, deoxyribonucleotide 
triphosphates (dNTPs) are included in the solution.  Magnesium chloride is another necessary 
reagent for PCR, as the magnesium ion maximizes the activity of the Taq polymerase (Gelfand 
and White 1990).  Many manufacturers of real-time PCR devices produce commercial pre-made 
master mixes that contain all the necessary primers, probes, enzymes and buffers at their optimal 
concentrations.  This speeds up sample preparation time and allows assay uniformity. 
To be a viable method for wastewater screening, the PCR process must be able to 
proceed without hindrance from the wastewater matrix.  This quality is important in determining 
PCR’s ability to screen for a wide variety of pathogens.  The sensitivity of PCR product 
detection must also be within levels that are of public health significance.  Salmonella 
typhimurium can be used as a bacterial model to determine the detection limits due to its ease of 
culturing and lower virulence compared to other pathogens of interest.  Its use also does not 
require special laboratory safety equipment or additional laboratory licensing. 
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2.4 SALMONELLA SPP. 
Salmonella spp. are a genus of bacteria in the family Enterobacteriaceae.  They are 
classified as facultatively anaerobic, non-spore-forming, gram-negative bacilli and are usually 
motile (Covert 1999).  There are over 2,000 Salmonella serotypes, or strains, some of which are 
pathogenic, causing salmonellosis.  In humans, the infection may cause gastroenteritis, enteric 
fever, and septicemia.  A severe type of enteric fever, typhoid fever, is caused by S. typhi, a 
strain that is only pathogenic to humans.  Other serotypes of interest, S. enteritidis and S. 
typhimurium, are both common causes of food poisoning in the United States.  S. enteritidis is 
most commonly associated with chickens because of the ease in which they are infected. The 
infection is asymptomatic for chickens, resulting in its ability to travel up the food chain and 
infect humans.  Salmonella has also been used as a biological warfare agent, when during World 
War II, the Japanese used the pathogen to contaminate the food and water of Chinese cities 
(Burrows and Renner 1999). 
Salmonella infection in humans typically results from the ingestion of contaminated 
water or food.  Once consumed, the bacterium passes through the stomach to the intestine where 
it can bind to the intestinal walls.  With the use of special proteins, it is able to pass through the 
intestinal wall and enter the blood stream, eventually traveling to the liver, spleen and gall 
bladder.  Infection of these organs may lead to focal lesions resulting in meningitis, endocarditis, 
pneumonia, or osteomyelitis (Covert 1999).  The bacterium can also continue to multiply in these 
organs and travel back in the intestine to perpetuate the illness within its host. 
Typical carriers of Salmonella include wild and domestic animals, especially poultry and 
swine.  Pets, including cats, may be asymptomatic carriers.  Humans can also serve as reservoirs 
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for infection without showing any symptoms.  Some birds and animals may even be chronic 
carriers of the bacteria. 
Salmonella infection can occur through the ingestion of food or water that has been 
contaminated with feces of infected hosts or by eating infected meat.  The median infective dose 
(ID50) for humans via ingestion ranges from 104 to 105 organisms, corresponding to a drinking 
water concentration of about 100 cfu/L for consumption of 15 L/day (Burrows and Renner 
1999).  Infection may occur with as little as 15-20 organisms depending on the age and health of 
the host and the virulence of the infecting strain (United Stated Food and Drug Administration). 
The Salmonella bacterium is able to survive in many environments.  It can remain stable 
in seawater for nine days, up to five months in ice, and in fresh water for about eight days 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, Burrows and Renner 1999).  When in fresh 
water, the organism can enter a viable, yet unculturable state.  This quality may contribute to its 
long-term survival.  It can live for weeks in sewage; 80% of activated sludge effluents contain 
Salmonella.  Salmonella may also pass through to the non-chlorinated wastewater effluents of 
wastewater plants with concentrations typically ranging from 1 to 1,100 colony-forming units 
(cfu)/100 mL (Covert 1999).  The bacteria can be rapidly inactivated by chlorine, as is the case 
with many other waterborne pathogens and indicator organisms.  Sodium hypochlorite solutions 
of 1% or lower concentrations are suggested to inactivate this organism (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency).  A chlorine residual of at least 0.2 mg/L is recommended to 
provide adequate protection in drinking water treatment systems.  High concentrations of salt, 
over 30% NaCl, have also been able to inactivate Salmonella typhi within one day (New Zealand 
Food Safety Authority). 
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The traditional method for Salmonella detection is to use selective enrichment and plating 
media to isolate the target organism from other bacterial cells.  This technique is long and labor-
intensive and may take several days to complete.  Other assays for the detection of Salmonella 
include fluorescent antibodies, latex agglutination, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
(ELISA), motility enrichment, and DNA hybridization (Rahn et al. 1992; Nguyen et al. 1993).  
These techniques are much quicker in their ability to detect the target organism, but lack  
specificity due to cross-reactions with bacteria that carry the same antigenic determinants.  To 
that end, PCR techniques have been developed to target specific and unique DNA sequences 
within the Salmonella genome.  Genes, such as invA, B, C, and D, allow Salmonella to enter 
epithelial cells in the body and lend to its pathogenesis (Rahn et al. 1992).  Given the specificity 
of PCR, targeting nucleotide sequences within these genes allow for the accurate detection of the 
pathogen. 
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3.0  PRIORITIZATION 
Prioritization is a method to analyze contaminants that may be introduced into wastewater 
treatment and collection systems.  Four endpoints were determined to be most critical in 
wastewater applications.  Each endpoint was evaluated using the same eight criteria.  A weighted 
score was calculated for each endpoint.  These scores were then compiled to determine which 
contaminants would be of the highest priority if found in wastewater treatment and collection 
systems. 
3.1 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The contaminant universe chosen for evaluation using the prioritization framework developed in 
this research were those that would be of concern to wastewater treatment and its infrastructure 
and collection systems.  The list of contaminants evaluated is shown in Appendix A.  
Contaminants that would be a priority for drinking water systems was the starting point in 
developing this list.  These contaminants were drawn from the Select Agent List developed by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and lists provided by the Water 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Water ISAC) and the U.S. Army.  Other contaminants 
considered for the wastewater prioritization were flammable chemicals as classified by the 
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Occupational Health and Safety Administration, radioactive elements, and decontamination 
agents (Perry 2003). 
The primary concern for drinking water contaminants is their effect on public health 
through exposure by ingestion.  For wastewater, the concerns are much broader in nature, being 
broken down into four endpoints: 
• Worker and Public Health 
• Process Upset 
• Physical Damage and Destruction 
• Pass Through 
Worker and public health took into account the effects of inhalation exposure of a given 
contaminant on the individual treatment plant worker and the surrounding community.  Process 
upset considered the effects of the contaminant on primary, secondary, and tertiary treatment and 
disinfection.  Physical damage and destruction dealt with the effects of fire or explosion on a 
wastewater treatment plant or collection system.  The consequences of infrastructure 
contamination by agents that may persist and adhere to infrastructure components were also 
considered.  Pass through was evaluated by assessing the deleterious effects of a contaminant on 
the flora and fauna of receiving waters and potential contamination of downstream drinking 
water facilities. 
These four endpoints were evaluated based on criteria that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) developed for the drinking water prioritization (Allgeier 2005).  Eight criteria 
were chosen to be pertinent to wastewater treatment (Table 3.1).  An appropriate description was 
assigned to each criterion with respect to wastewater treatment and collection systems.  Each 
criterion was assessed with respect to the each of the four endpoints developed for wastewater 
 18 
(Figure 3.1).  A literature review was performed for each contaminant to gather information 
pertaining to each of the criteria.  Emphasis was placed on open, reputable sources, such as 
government websites and reference handbooks on industrial chemicals. 
Business rules of scoring, as defined by the USEPA, were applied to each criterion 
ranging from 1 to 5, from least significant to most (Table 3.2).  These rules were developed to 
provide a quantitative approach to contaminant analysis with respect to the prioritization criteria.  
They were also designed to encompass a wide range of possibilities.  Scoring was based on 
information found for each contaminant regarding the criterion in question.  For example, the 
scoring basis for the availability criterion ranged from contaminants that could be easily obtained 
(e.g., gasoline, common household products) to contaminants that can only be obtained from 
secure facilities, such as the majority of radioactive elements.  These criteria were given a score 
of 5 and 1, respectively.  The other scores were determined by varying the degree of availability 
of the contaminant.  This same logic was applied to the other criteria being evaluated.  
Contaminants for which no or ambiguous data were found with respect to the criterion in 
question, a score of 3 was given. 
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 Table 3.1.  Criteria descriptions as they apply to wastewater contamination 
Criterion Description 
Availability The ease with which the contaminant can be obtained, synthesized or 
harvested from natural, industrial or commercial sources. 
 
Potency The amount of a contaminant that would be required to contaminate a 
reference volume of water at a flammable/explosive level or a 
toxic/infectious dose. This criterion considers the flammable nature, 
toxicity, infectivity and purity of the contaminant. This criterion may be 
defined differently for different endpoints. 
 
Persistence The time that a contaminant remains toxic, infectious or flammable after 
introduction into a wastewater collection and treatment system. 
 
Introduction/ 
Dispersion 
The ease with which a contaminant can be handled and effectively 
introduced and dispersed into a wastewater collection and treatment 
system. 
 
Process Removal 
(Inactivation/ 
Treatability) 
The removal or inactivation of a contaminant by typical wastewater 
treatment unit processes (primary treatment, secondary treatment, 
disinfection and sludge/biosolids treatment and disposal). 
 
Storability The time that a contaminant remains toxic, flammable or infectious while 
in storage (prior to intentional contamination of a wastewater collection 
and treatment system). 
 
Outcomes 
     (Human Illness) 
 
The severity of human health effects for wastewater treatment plant 
workers exposed to the contaminant or the extent of the physical 
damage/destruction or process disruption associated with the presence of 
the contaminant in the wastewater collection and treatment system. 
 
Additional Outcomes have been developed to describe the extent of 
process upset and contaminant pass through. 
 
 
Public Perception Public perception of the risks associated with the contaminant (e.g., the 
fear that the public has developed toward anthrax following the US Mail 
attacks of 2001), the inconvenience associated with the disruption or 
destruction of the wastewater collection and treatment system, or the 
presence of wastewater (i.e., using sewage as a weapon). 
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Storability 
Outcomes 
Public Perception
Availability 
Introduction/Dispersion
Persistence 
Process Removal
Potency 
Physical Damage/ 
Destruction 
Pass Through 
Worker/Public Health 
Process Upset 
 
Figure 3.1  Framework Flow Chart 
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Table 3.2.  Business Rules for Scoring of Each Criterion 
Criterion Score Basis for Score
1 Contaminant only exists in secure facilities and could 
not be generated without access to specialized 
information/equipment.
2 Contaminant is secured, but precursors may be 
available and synthesis is possible but difficult.
3 Controlled material with limited production.
4 Controlled material with widespread application.
5 Readily available from commercial, industrial, or 
natural sources (or easily synthesized).
1 High ID50, High Flashpoint, High Lower Explosive 
Limit, High LD50, High LC50 (e.g., ID50 > 100,000 
microbes per ml)
2 ID50 between 10,000 and 100,000 microbes per ml
3 ID50 between 1,000 and 10,000 microbes per ml
4 ID50 between 100 and 1,000 microbes per ml
5 Low ID50, Low Flashpoint, Low Lower Explosive 
Limit, Low LD50, Low LC50 (e.g., ID50 < 100 
microbes per ml )
1 Contaminant is known to degrade to harmless end 
products immediately upon contact with water or 
wastewater.
2 Contaminant remains viable in water or wastewater 
for up to two hours.
3 Contaminant remains viable in water or wastewater 
for between two hours and one day.
4 Contaminant remains viable in water or wastewater 
for between one day and one week.
5 Contaminant remains viable in water or wastewater 
for more than one week, or produces more hazardous 
end products in water and wastewater than the initial 
contaminant.
Availability
Potency (Note, potency 
tables have been developed 
for LD 50 , Flashpoint, etc. 
similar to the ID 50 
information shown here 
and the flammable potency 
chart on Page 6)
Persistence
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Table 3.2.  Business Rules for Scoring (continued) 
Criterion Score Basis for Score
1 Difficult to introduce and specialized equipment is 
required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.
2 Industrial equipment is required to introduce or 
disperse the contaminant.
3 Commercial equipment is required to introduce or 
disperse the contaminant.
4 Household equipment is required to introduce or 
disperse the contaminant.
5 Easily introduced and no equipment is required to 
introduce or disperse the contaminant. The 
contaminant is easily introduced and dispersed.
Process Removal 1 Contaminant is removed from the wastewater in the 
pretreatment or primary treatment processes.
(Inactivation/Treatability) 2 Contaminant is removed from the wastewater in the 
biological treatment process/secondary sedimentation 
3 Contaminant is removed or inactivated by 
conventional wastewater treatment disinfection 
processes. Unknown Process Removal = 3
4 Contaminant is only removed or inactivated by 
tertiary treatment or specialized unit processes.
5 Contaminant is not removed during wastewater 
treatment unit processes.
Storability 1 Not capable of being stored
2 Half-life/infectivity of the contaminant in storage is 
less than 1 day.
3 Half-life/infectivity of the contaminant in storage is 
between 1 day and 2 weeks.
4 Half-life/infectivity of the contaminant in storage is 
between 2 weeks and 6 months.
5 Half-life/infectivity of the contaminant in storage is 
greater than 6 months.
1 No adverse effect expected.
2 Minor effects expected. Simple or normal operational 
adjustments are required to deal with the 
contaminant.
3 Manageable effects expected. Treatment processes 
must be altered or changed. No remediation is 
required.
4 Serious effects expected. Public notification is 
required. Treatment plant processes are upset and 
remediation is required.
5 Catastrophic effects expected. Treatment 
Public Perception 1 The public is unaware of the substance or problems 
with the substance.
2 Common substance not linked to terrorist activities
3 Exotic substance not linked to terrorist activities
4 Common substance linked to terrorist activities
5 Exotic substance linked to terrorist activities
Outcomes             
(Result of 
Contamination, 
additional outcomes 
have been developed to 
describe the extent of 
human illness and the 
possible outcomes of 
pass through)
Introduction/Dispersion
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A method of scoring for potency and outcome was established for each of the endpoints 
because of the different factors in evaluating these criteria.  Worker impact potency was scored 
by evaluating the occupational exposure levels as required by OSHA and the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).  This included Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) 
as required by OSHA, and the Recommended Exposure Limit (REL) and Immediately 
Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) concentration as suggested by NIOSH.  These limits were 
put in place to establish allowable airborne concentrations of chemicals to ensure the health and 
safety of workers.   Both the long-term (PEL and REL) and short-term (IDLH) exposure 
concentrations were scored for the prioritization as these numbers put the potential inhalational 
toxicity of a substance into quantifiable terms (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).  In both instances, the scoring 
for the PELs, RELs, and IDLHs increased as the concentration of the exposure limit decreased. 
The long-term exposure limits were increased by an order of magnitude to determine the scoring 
for varying concentrations.  The procedure for the IDLH was slightly different in that the ranges 
for individual scores were larger.  This difference took into account the fact that larger 
concentrations were documented for short-term exposure limits.  The IDLH takes into account 
the acute toxicity of a substance, and in the event of volatile chemical contamination of a 
wastewater treatment system, the IDLH would be of greater importance as the attack would be 
more likely be a one-time instance rather than be sustained over a long period of time. 
Table 3.3.  Business Rules for Potency Scoring for PEL and REL 
Score ppm
1 > 1,000
2 100 to 1,000
3 10 to 100
4 1 to 10
5 < 1  
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Table 3.4.  Business Rules for Potency Scoring for IDLH 
Score ppm
1 > 5,000 
2 1,000 to 5,000
3 100 to 1,000 
4 1 to 100
5  < 1  
A different parameter was needed to account for the potency of pathogenic agents with 
respect to the worker and public health endpoint.  The documented ID50 (the infective dose 
needed to cause illness in 50% of the exposed population) was used to score these biological 
agents.   Typically, these numbers are based on exposure by ingestion.  This route of exposure 
would not be likely with wastewater, but many of the pathogens in question can be aerosolized, 
leading to their ability to be inhaled, thus causing infection.  In this instance, ID50’s based on 
inhalation were evaluated and scored (Table 3.5).  Again, the highest score was given to the 
lowest concentration of microbes, and scoring increased as the concentration increased by an 
order of magnitude.   
Table 3.5.  Business Rules for Potency Scoring for ID50
Score ID50 Value (microbes per 100 mL)
1 > 100,000
2 10,000 to 100,000
3 1,000 to 10,000
4 100 to 1,000
5 <100  
Flammable agents that may be intentionally introduced into a wastewater treatment 
system could lead to the physical damage and destruction of the collection system and unit 
operations within the plant.  Two properties of volatile chemicals, the flash point and lower 
explosive limit (LEL), were used to develop a scoring method for their potency.  Each property 
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was placed on a separate axis of a two-dimensional table, which would be used to calculate a 
composite potency score.  The flash point, the lowest temperature at which a liquid’s vapor can 
form an ignitable mixture with air, was scored from 1 to 5 based on the ambient temperatures 
found in wastewater treatment facilities and distribution systems.  Flash points below 10°C were 
scored a 5, as this was lowest temperature documented in many cold weather wastewater 
treatment facilities (U.S. Army and Air Force 1987).  A score of 4 was assigned to flash points 
between 10°C and 30°C, representative of the higher end of temperatures present in wastewater 
treatment facilities (Tchobanoglous et al. 2002).  For flash points above 30°C, scores of 3 to 1 
were arbitrarily assigned with lower scores given to higher temperatures. 
Scoring for the LEL, defined as the percentage of vapor of a volatile needed to create an 
explosive mixture with air, was determined for percentages ranging from below 1% to those 
above 12%.  Those LEL’s 2% and below were scored a LEL factor of 5 corresponding to the 
increased likelihood of explosion when lower concentrations of the vapor of a volatile substance 
are necessary.  To score the other LEL’s, these factors were decreasingly assigned in 3% 
increments as the LEL increased.  This resulted in a LEL factor of 4 for 3% and an LEL factor of 
1 for a lower explosive limit above 12%. 
A composite potency score was calculated by averaging the factors for the lower 
explosive limit and flash point and rounding up to the next integer (Table 3.6).  For example, a 
substance with a flash point of 40°C, corresponding to a factor of 3, and a LEL of 2% (a factor of 
5) would result in an overall score of 4 (Equation 3.1). 
 
Flammable Potency = (Flash Point Factor + LEL Factor) / 2                                        (3.1) 
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Table 3.6.  Flammable Contaminant Potency Scoring Chart 
 
The potency of contaminants for the endpoints of process upset and pass through was 
determined by their concentration in water, measured in parts per million (ppm).  Scoring for 
these criteria increased as concentration decreased, and the scoring for this data is identical to 
that of the ID50 (Table 3.7).  The potency for process upset was determined by the documented 
toxicity of Pseudomonas spp., a major component of activated sludge flocs (Bitton 2005).  The 
documented ecotoxicity of freshwater fish was used to score the potency of contaminants, with 
the lower concentrations assigned a higher score. 
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Table 3.7.  Business Rules for Potency Scoring for LC50, Lethal Concentration for 50% 
Score ppm
1 > 100,000 
2 10,000 to 100,000
3 1,000 to 10,000 
4 100 to 1,000
5  < 100  
Weighting factors were developed for each of the eight criteria to determine overall relative 
importance of each criterion with respect to the endpoint in question as compared to the other 
seven criteria.  The analysis was based on the analytic hierarchy and network process in which 
each criterion was compared to the others and was assigned a numerical score based on 
importance (Saaty 2005).  The scores for each of the criteria were summed, and then normalized.  
The weighting factors developed for each endpoint are presented in Table 3.8.  The criteria 
considered being of the utmost importance for worker and public health, process upset, and 
physical damage and destruction is the overall outcome of the contamination.  A contamination 
event may result in worker illness and death with possible effects on the surrounding community.  
Process upset may cause untreated sewage to be released into receiving waters, requiring 
extensive remediation efforts within the treatment plant and areas downstream.  The effects of 
contaminants that may be responsible for physical damage and destruction may be the complete 
destruction of the treatment plant or its collection system, requiring extensive remediation and 
rebuilding.  Individual components of the treatment and collection system can also be damaged 
in which remediation and clean-up would be necessary to bring them back online. 
 Public perception was considered to be the most important criterion in the event of 
contaminant pass through into receiving waters.  Contaminants may result in fish kills and the 
harming of flora and fauna in the surrounding areas of the receiving waters.  Downstream water 
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treatment plant intakes may also have to be closed due to the contamination.  While these 
scenarios are possible outcomes of the pass through of a contaminant, the public perception of 
such events would be considered more important.  Each of these outcomes may result in 
considerable public outrage and media coverage and a general mistrust of the utility.  If the 
contamination was due to an intentional attack, these outcomes may also result in public fear as 
well. 
Table 3.8.  Weighting Factors for Prioritization Framework 
Criteria 
Worker/Public 
Health 
Process 
Upset 
Physical 
Damage/Destruction 
Pass 
Through
Availability 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.03 
Potency 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Persistence 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.16 
Introduction/Dispersion 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.03 
Process Removal 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.16 
Storability 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 
Outcomes 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.20 
Public Perception 0.24 0.02 0.29 0.33 
 
The composite prioritization score for each endpoint was determined by multiplying the 
weighting factor for each criterion by the numerical score assigned to each factor.   These 
numbers were then summed (Equation 3.2). 
Score = Av*W1 + Po*W2 + Pe*W3 + ID*W4 + Prem*W5 + St*W6 + Out*W7 + Pp*W8  (3.2) 
Where: 
Av - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Availability 
Po - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Potency 
Pe - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Persistence 
ID - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Introduction/Dispersion 
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Prem - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Process Removal 
St - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Storability 
Out - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Outcomes  
Pp - numerical value assigned to the criteria of Public Perception 
W1 - Weighting Factor for Availability 
W2 - Weighting Factor for Potency 
W3 - Weighting Factor for Persistence 
W4 - Weighting Factor for Introduction/Dispersion 
W5 - Weighting Factor for Process Removal 
W6 - Weighting Factor for Storability 
W7 - Weighting Factor for Outcomes 
W8 - Weighting Factor for Public Perception 
The composite score developed for each endpoint for a single contaminant could then be 
compared to those scores of other contaminants to determine those that would be the highest 
priority for screening in a wastewater treatment plant and collection system. 
3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A total of 78 contaminants were analyzed within the prioritization framework.  
Weighting factors were applied to the scores to come up with a composite score for each of the 
four endpoints analyzed in this scheme.  The composite score for each endpoint ranges from 1 to 
5, with 5 indicating a highly hazardous contaminant with respect to the endpoint in question.  
The prioritization of contaminants is to show that the higher the overall score for each endpoint, 
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the higher the priority of screening for that contaminant in a wastewater treatment system.  Data 
sheets for the most dangerous contaminants with respect to specific endpoints are presented in 
Appendix B. 
The first endpoint to be analyzed was worker and public health.  The primary factors in 
scoring this endpoint is the potency of the contaminant as determined by the OSHA and NIOSH 
guidelines for inhalation exposure and the effects of acute inhalation exposure to the 
contaminant.  The ten most important contaminants with their composite scores are listed as 
follows (Table 3.9): 
Table 3.9.  Top ten contaminants of concern for worker and public health 
CONTAMINANT 
Worker/Public 
Health Score 
Botulinum Toxin 4.39 
VX 4.33 
Cyanide Salts 4.00 
Arsenic 3.91 
Mercury 3.91 
Bacillus anthracis 3.83 
Cobalt - 60 3.80 
Malathion 3.75 
Cesium - 137 3.65 
Strontium - 90 3.64 
 
Wastewater contaminants that would be most harmful to worker and public health cannot be 
classified into a single category.  Radioactive isotopes, heavy metals, biological and chemical 
weapons, and highly toxic chemical compounds are all represented on this list.  Those that would 
be most important to screen for would be those that are easily aerosolized.  This would be 
primary route of exposure for treatment plant workers and members of the surrounding 
community.  Spore-forming bacteria, like Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum (the 
bacteria responsible for producing Botulinum toxin), can be easily aerosolized and have been 
weaponized for wartime use in the past. 
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The radioactive isotopes such as Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, and Strontium-90, do not pose 
much of an inhalation threat.  They are not easily aerosolized and pose more of a chronic 
radiation exposure threat.  However, if large quantities are present, radiation sickness may occur 
in exposed workers. 
Possibly the most deadly of chemical agents, VX and cyanide salts, pose the greatest 
human health risk if they were to be volatilized into the air by a treatment process.   Very small 
quantities of these chemicals, if inhaled, can cause death. 
Process upset is characterized by the ability of a contaminant to disrupt or upset the 
various treatment processes within a wastewater treatment plant.  This will most likely occur in 
biological processes, such as secondary treatment and nitrification and denitrification processes, 
in which microorganisms are used.  These contaminants may retard the respiration and growth of 
microbes, thus rendering them unable to remove the organic and inorganic materials in 
wastewater.  Other contaminants may cause deflocculation, causing problems in settling tanks 
and the pass through of untreated sewage throughout the plant.  Upset can also occur during 
disinfection, where contaminants may react with the chlorine, increasing the chlorine demand of 
the process and possibly creating more dangerous chemicals in the process.  Those contaminants 
of interest are listed in Table 3.10. 
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 Table 3.10.  The top eleven contaminants with respect to Process Upset 
CONTAMINANT Process Upset Score 
Malathion 4.31 
Mercury 4.22 
Calcium Hypochlorite 4.21 
Pentane 4.21 
1-Chloro-2,4-Dinitrobenzene 4.20 
Cadmium 4.19 
Lead 4.11 
Carbon Disulfide 4.08 
Phenol 4.03 
Fuel Oils 4.01 
2,4-Dinitrophenol 4.01 
 
Heavy metals, such as mercury, cadmium, and lead, can be easily integrated into the flocs during 
secondary treatment, causing deflocculation and decreases in COD removal.  Because they are 
not metabolized by microorganisms, remediation efforts would be necessary to remove the 
metals from the plant. 
2,4-Dinitrophenol (DNP) and 1-chloro-2,4-dinitrobenzene (CNDB) are industrial 
chemicals that can severely inhibit the nitrification process.  Both also inhibit the respiration 
rates of mixed liquor, leading the reduction in COD removal.  2,4-DNP is especially toxic to 
anaerobic systems. 
Malathion and carbon disulfide, a pesticide and an intermediate in pesticide production 
respectively, have been shown to inhibit the nitrification process.  Both may also increase the 
chlorine demand of wastewater disinfection.  Malathion can be neutralized by chlorination, and 
this is a common tertiary process for its removal from wastewater streams.  However, carbon 
disulfide also reacts readily with chlorine to form carbon tetrachloride, a documented carcinogen. 
Calcium hypochlorite is a disinfectant commonly used in swimming pools and drinking 
water applications.  Because of its use as a disinfectant, its introduction into wastewater 
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treatment systems may severely hinder secondary treatment by killing the microorganisms 
necessary for the process.  Remediation would be necessary after its introduction. 
The third endpoint analyzed was the physical damage and destruction of the wastewater 
treatment plant and collection system.  This may result from the buildup of vapors above the 
lower explosive limit within sewers requiring only a small spark to ignite, as previously 
documented.  Some contaminants, due to their chemical properties, may adhere to infrastructure 
components of the treatment plant.  They may also persist throughout the wastewater treatment 
system without being degraded, and plant shutdown and remediation efforts would be necessary.  
The contaminants of most concern according to their composite score are (Table 3.11): 
Table 3.11.  Top ten contaminants with respect to treatment plant physical damage and destruction 
CONTAMINANT 
Physical Damage / Destruction 
Score 
VX 4.23 
Bacillus anthracis 4.22 
Kerosene 4.03 
Gasoline 4.03 
Octane 3.97 
Isopropyl Alcohol 3.94 
Hexane 3.91 
Styrene 3.90 
Acetone 3.90 
Arsenic 3.83 
 
Most prominent on this list are flammable organics that can easily be introduced into collection 
systems through open sewers.  Once they enter the treatment plant, they may be degraded during 
secondary treatment or stripped from the wastewater during aeration due to their volatility.  This 
phenomenon can raise the concentrations of these chemicals to explosive and/or flammable 
levels and also may pose as a further threat to worker and public health.  The introduction of 
styrene may be particularly dangerous, because it polymerizes easily upon contamination.  This 
could result in the clogging of pipelines.  The monomer has also been responsible for several 
 34 
industrial explosions.  It also forms peroxides quite easily upon exposure to oxygen, which are 
also quite explosive. 
Pathogens are common constituents of flocs in wastewater, but due to grazing by 
protozoa and disinfection, generally do not survive long enough to reach the effluent.  Results of 
testing indicate that Bacillus anthracis spores may be able to withstand the rigors of wastewater 
treatment.  Spores may become integrated within the floc structures of secondary treatment, and 
they are highly resistant to chlorine disinfection.  Given that the spores can survive in aqueous 
environments for decades, extensive remediation would be necessary for their removal. 
VX, due to its chemical structure, can adsorb to organic carbon, prevalent within 
wastewater, and adhere to infrastructure components of the treatment plant and collection 
system.  Its high toxicity makes remediation of the plant a necessity in order to prevent VX from 
passing through into receiving waters and possibly entering drinking water installations 
downstream. 
The final endpoint to be analyzed was the pass through of the contaminant into the 
receiving waters of the wastewater treatment plant.  Of greatest concern are the effects of the 
contaminants on wildlife, especially fish, and plant life.  If the contaminant is not removed by the 
receiving waters, there is also the potential that it may enter the raw water intakes of the drinking 
water facilities, becoming a greater threat to the human population.  Contaminants that would 
pose the greatest risk to the surrounding environment according to its composite score are (Table 
3.12): 
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 Table 3.12.  Top eleven contaminants with respect to treatment plant pass through  
CONTAMINANT Pass Through Score 
VX 4.83 
Cyanide Salts 4.38 
Bacillus anthracis 4.10 
Aldicarb 4.03 
DDT 4.02 
Plutonium-238 3.86 
Pentane 3.80 
Lead 3.80 
Arsenic 3.76 
Cyclohexanol 3.75 
1-Chloro-2,4-Dinitrobenzene 3.75 
 
This list is comprised of pathogens, pesticides, radioactive elements, chemical warfare agents, 
organic chemicals, and other highly poisonous chemicals.  VX is by far the most toxic compound 
according to its composite score of 4.83.  It is especially harmful to fish, birds, and wildlife, with 
only very minute quantities needed to cause death. 
VX chemistry is very similar to that of organophosphates, compounds commonly used 
for the basis of pesticides.  These are typically cholinesterase inhibitors, severely affecting the 
nervous system at very small doses.  Aldicarb, in the carbamate family, is a pesticide that acts in 
the very same way, having the same effects on wildlife as that of VX.  DDT is another pesticide 
that can have dire consequences for the fauna living in receiving waters and other animals that 
use its waters.  DDT is also able to bioaccumulate in the tissues of animals, making its effects 
persistent and long lasting.   
Lead is another contaminant with the ability to bioaccumulate in wildlife.  It has no 
metabolic purpose and acts a toxicant in fish and animals.  Other contaminants, such as cyanide 
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salts and arsenic, are not likely to bioaccumulate, but will be likely to responsible for fish kills if 
released into receiving waters. 
Organic chemicals like pentane and 1-chloro-2,4-dinitrobenzene can also be toxic to 
aquatic organisms.  Due to pentane’s hydrophobic structure, it will form a slick on the surface of 
receiving waters, preventing oxygen from dissolving into the water, potentially smothering 
aquatic life. 
Plutonium-238 is considered one of the most poisonous radioactive substances known to 
man.  Its introduction into receiving waters is expected to cause great ecological stress on aquatic 
flora and fauna and those living in areas bordering the waterways.  Land that has been 
contaminated by this isotope of plutonium is generally deemed unsuitable for public use. 
As previously stated, Bacillus anthracis can cause disease in animals.  Its spores would 
be able to persist in the receiving waters without being inactivated.  Fish and vegetation are not 
expected to be affected by its pass through. 
There is no one specific type of contaminant that can be considered harmful with respect 
to the four endpoints.  Biological and chemical agents, flammable organics, heavy metals, and 
radionuclides exhibit properties that would be detrimental if introduced into a wastewater 
treatment and collection system.  A means to quickly identify these contaminants needs to be 
developed for use by emergency response teams.  One such technique is real-time, rapid cycle 
PCR for use in the detection of biological agents. 
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4.0  PATHOGEN SCREENING AND DETERMINATION OF DETECTION LIMITS 
OF REAL-TIME RAPID CYCLE PCR USING SALMONELLA TYPHIMURIUM 
A series of three evaluations were performed to determine the efficacy of using real-time rapid 
cycle PCR as a screening tool for wastewater.  Screening tests were performed to determine the 
presence of interferences within the wastewater matrix.  Secondly, experiments using Salmonella 
typhimurium were designed to determine the detection limits of the R.A.P.I.D.® PCR System by 
comparing the PCR results with traditional plate culturing techniques.  Lastly, a field 
concentration method was applied to river water and secondary effluent to determine any 
improvements in bacteria recovery by culture technique and PCR detection. 
4.1 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
4.1.1 Phase I – Screening for pathogens 
Three steps were necessary to perform real-time PCR using the R.A.P.I.D.® System:  DNA 
extraction and purification, PCR reaction set-up, and R.A.P.I.D.® PCR set-up.  Each step was 
performed in three separate areas to prevent the possibility of cross-contamination, as this could 
lead to erroneous results (i.e., false positives). 
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DNA extraction was performed using the 1-2-3 DNA™ Purification Kit (IdahoTech).  
Extractions were prepared from six water samples: 
• Distilled and Deionized Water 
(Millique) 
• Allegheny River Water 
• Finished Chlorinated Drinking Water 
(Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority) 
• Chlorinated Secondary Effluent 
(Allegheny Valley Joint Sewage 
Authority) 
• Mixed Liquor (AVJSA) 
• Primary Effluent (AVJSA) 
 
Three samples, filtered drinking water, river water, and secondary effluent, were also 
concentrated using a field portable unit involving a hand pump and a disposable filter.  The 
filtered drinking water was concentrated from a volume of 2 L down to 2 mL for a 1000-fold 
decrease in volume.  An initial volume of 500 mL was chosen for concentrating the river water 
and secondary effluent due to the high turbidity of both samples.  The filter unit consisted of a 
300-mL polypropylene funnel and a 47-mm mixed cellulose-ester membrane filter with a pore 
size of 0.45 microns.  The sample to be concentrated was filtered through the membrane using a 
hand pump that used suction to draw the water through.  Once the entire sample was filtered, the 
membrane was removed using forceps and sterile technique and placed into a sterile 15-mL 
polystyrene centrifuge tube.  Two (2) milliliters of a surfactant containing 0.05% turgitol was 
added to the centrifuge tube, and the tube was vortexed at maximum speed for about a minute 
using a field portable vortex.  This allowed for the removal of all particles and possible 
microorganisms trapped on the filter.  The filter was then removed using sterile forceps and 
squeezed dry.  The resulting eluate was then used to prepare DNA extractions for the screening 
tests. 
The bead tubes provided in the 1-2-3 Kit contained glass microbeads along with lysis 
buffer and molecular grade water.  Prior to extraction, the bead tubes were centrifuged for 30 
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seconds to ensure its contents were at the bottom of the tube.  A volume of 100 μL of sample was 
used for each DNA extraction, regardless of water type, and was added to each bead tube.  The 
samples were beat for five minutes using a Vortex Genie 2 with the Turbomix 2.0 mL adapter 
(Scientific Industries).  This aided in breaking the cells possibly present in the sample, releasing 
the DNA.  Using a P-1000 pipette (Gilson), 350 μL of Buffer 1 was added to the bead tube.  
Buffer 1 is a high salt buffer containing guanidine HCl, Triton X-100 (a nonionic surfactant used 
to solubilize cell membrane proteins [Roche Applied Science]), and isopropanol.  The bead tube 
was centrifuged again for 30 seconds.  The liquid was extracted using the P-1000 pipette, being 
careful not to draw up the glass beads, and transferred to a spin filter placed in a receiving tube.  
This assembly was then centrifuged for 2 minutes to allow all the liquid to pass through to the 
receiving tube, thus binding the DNA to the spin filter. 
The spin filter was placed in a new receiving tube, and the second washing step was 
performed.  A volume of 550 μL of Buffer 2, denatured ethanol, was pipetted into the new spin 
filter-receiver assembly.  The assembly was then centrifuged for 2 minutes to allow the second 
buffer to pass through the spin filter.  This step removed humic and fulvic acids that could be 
present in the sample, and subsequently could interfere with the PCR reaction and analysis.  
After centrifugation, the spin filter was placed in a new receiver tube and centrifuged again for 3 
minutes.  This removed any residual ethanol that could hinder the PCR reaction. 
The third step involved eluting the bound DNA from the spin filter into solution.  The 
spin filter was placed into a new receiver tube, and 400 μL of Buffer 3, a solution of Trizma HCl 
and EDTA Disodium, was pipetted into the assembly.  This was allowed to sit for 2 minutes and 
then was centrifuged for an additional two minutes.  The spin filter was thrown away, and the 
remaining solution containing the DNA was stored at 2 - 4°C. 
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After the DNA extractions, each water sample was analyzed for 11 pathogens to 
determine their background presence in water and wastewater.  The assays performed are as 
follows: 
• Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax), 
• Clostridium botulinum Type A, 
• Brucella spp., 
• Yersinia pestis (Plague), 
• Francisella tularensis (Tularemia), 
• Salmonella spp., 
• Escherichia coli O157, 
• Listeria monocytogenes, 
• Campylobacter spp., 
• Cryptosporidium spp. 
• Variola (Small Pox) 
 
Freeze-dried reagents from Idaho Technology, Inc. were used for the PCR reaction setup.  
For each pathogen, there were positive and negative control vials and unknown reagent vials 
spiked with the appropriate DNA primers for the target DNA sequence.  The positive and 
negative controls were reconstituted with 40 μL of sterile PCR grade water, while the unknowns 
were prepared using 40 μL of the previously extracted DNA.   The reconstituted vial contents 
were transferred into two capillary tubes and briefly centrifuged to ensure that the contents were 
in the bottom of the tube. 
The prepared capillary tubes were placed into the carousel of the thermocycler according 
the Load Window of the R.A.P.I.D.® program.  Each run was preprogrammed into the computer 
with the appropriate numbers of cycles and required temperature profile for DNA denaturation 
and amplification.  The fluorescence of each sample was measured by the instrument and 
recorded by the computer.  At the end of the PCR run, the results were analyzed by the 
manufacturer-provided software, making a qualitative “Present/Not Detected” determination of 
the target pathogen’s presence. 
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4.1.2 Phase II – Detection Limits of Salmonella in River Water and Wastewater Matrices 
The detection limits for the rapid cycle real-time PCR assay for Salmonella spp. were determined 
using four water samples: 
• Allegheny River Water 
• Chlorinated Secondary Effluent (Allegheny Valley Joint Sewage Authority) 
• Mixed Liquor (AVJSA) 
• Primary Effluent (AVJSA) 
Each water sample was spiked with Salmonella typhimurium and then analyzed using PCR and 
traditional culturing methods.  The results of these techniques were then compared to determine 
the detection limits of the R.A.P.I.D.® system. 
The bacteria culture was derived from a commercial strain (ATTC14028) and was 
cultured overnight at 37°C in 150 mL of nutrient broth.  A quarter of this stock solution, about 
37.5 mL, was pipetted into 500 mL of autoclaved water sample to be tested.  Seventeen 
additional flasks containing 500 mL of water sample were autoclaved for five minutes to remove 
background bacteria that may skew the experiment results.  Serial dilutions were prepared in 
these flasks in 0.5-log increments from 10-1 to 10-9 using the initial Salmonella-spiked solution as 
a basis.  From each dilution, DNA was extracted and purified for PCR analysis.  The dilutions 
were also cultured for Salmonella by spreadplating 0.1 mL onto nutrient media.  Aliquots of 0.1 
mL and 0.2 mL were plated for dilutions 10-6 and higher.  The plates were incubated for 24 hours 
at 37°C, and the colonies that grew were counted the next day.  The extracted DNA was 
analyzed in duplicate using Salmonella assay kits, where a present/not detected result could be 
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determined.  These results were compared to the qualitative results of the plate counts, and a 
detection limit for the PCR method could be determined. 
4.1.3 Phase III – Detection Limits of Salmonella in River Water and Secondary Effluent 
using a Concentration Method 
The concentration method previously described in Phase I was applied to determine any 
improvement in the detection limits of the PCR method.  This technique was previously applied 
to finished, but not yet chlorinated, drinking water by concentration from 2 L to 2 mL (States et 
al. 2006).  In this study, the river water sample was concentrated from 500 mL to 2 mL.  Due to 
its high turbidity and visible suspended solids, only 250 mL of the secondary effluent was able to 
be concentrated for this experiment.  All water samples were autoclaved for 5 minutes prior to 
being spiked with the Salmonella culture.  Dilutions were plated for both the unconcentrated and 
concentrated samples as described in the Phase II Materials and Methods section.  DNA was 
extracted for each of the dilutions as previously described in the Materials and Methods section 
for Phase I.  These extractions were then analyzed for Salmonella spp. using the R.A.P.I.D.® 
PCR.  The presence of Salmonellae was confirmed by one or both capillary tubes testing 
positive.  The lowest dilution at which there was a Salmonellae presence in the concentrated 
sample was compared to the bacterial count at the same dilution in the unconcentrated sample.  
This comparison determined how much bacteria in the original sample could be detected by the 
PCR when concentrated. 
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4.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.2.1 Phase I – Screening for pathogens 
As discussed in the Materials and Methods section, screening tests for various pathogenic 
organisms were performed on nine drinking water and wastewater samples using the R.A.P.I.D.® 
PCR.  Two unique PCR assay kits contained tests for eight pathogens.  The BioThreat Screening 
Kit (IdahoTech) tested for F. tularensis, B. anthracis, Y. pestis, and Brucella spp., while the 
Pathogen Test Kit (IdahoTech) screened for E. coli O157, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella 
spp., and Campylobacter spp.  These assays were performed on each individual water sample.  
Individual assays were also performed for Cryptosporidium spp., Clostridium botulinum Type A, 
and Variola.  Each screening test was performed in quadruplicate with the contents of two vials 
being divided into four capillary tubes total.  All PCR results were evaluated using the software 
supplied by IdahoTech and reported in a qualitative Present/Not Detected format.  Samples were 
considered positive when at least one capillary tube returned a confirmation of pathogen 
presence.  As an example, the results of the Salmonella screening tests are provided in Table 4.1.  
Each water matrix was analyzed for Salmonella spp. in quadruplicate, and the results were 
reported as the number of hits per number of capillary tubes analyzed.  The same format was 
used in analyzing the other pathogens being screened, and all screening tests results are shown in 
Appendix C. 
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 Table 4.1.  PCR Results of the Screening Tests for Salmonella spp. 
Water Matrix Date Tested PCR Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/21/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/23/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/25/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/26/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 8/25/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 10/12/2006 0/4 
 
The screening tests were designed to determine if any background interference from pathogenic 
material existed.  No interferences were found in the drinking water samples.  Assays on Primary 
Effluent, Mixed Liquor and Concentrated Secondary Effluent yielded a confirmation of the 
presence of Brucella spp. (Table 4.2).  All four capillary tubes yielded a positive result for the 
Primary Effluent sample.  The Mixed Liquor sample gave a confirmation of two hits.  Tests of 
Concentrated Secondary Effluent also yielded a positive result, with three out of four capillary 
tubes having the target DNA present.  To confirm that the positive results reported were not the 
result of the DNA contamination, DNA extractions of Millique water and Primary Effluent were 
compared using the BioThreat Screening Kit, which contains the Brucella spp. screening test.  
The results confirmed that there was no contaminant present in the deionized water sample (no 
hits out of two samples), but present in the primary effluent (two hits out of two samples). 
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 Table 4.2.  PCR Results of Screening Tests for Brucella spp. 
Water Matrix Date Tested 
PCR 
Results
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/29/2006 0/4 
River Water 8/10/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/14/2006 4/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/14/2006 2/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/10/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 3/4 
DI: 0/2 Comparison of 
Distilled Water and 
Primary Effluent 8/15/2006 PE: 2/2 
 
Brucella spp. are Gram-negative bacteria typically found in livestock and responsible for causing 
undulant fever in humans.  The bacterium was weaponized by the United States in the 1940s, but 
these stockpiles have since been destroyed.  It has also been classified as a Select Agent by the 
Centers of Disease Control and Prevention due to its potential to pose a severe threat to public 
health and safety.  Because of this classification, the likelihood of this bacterium being present in 
wastewater systems without prior warning or knowledge is highly improbable.  There were no 
incidents of Brucella contamination reported to the local health department.  An explanation for 
this supposed presence is that the PCR assay may be cross-reacting with other bacteria present in 
the three wastewater matrices.  The manufacturer of the assay kit makes note that the Brucella 
assay may also detect Ochrobactrum anthropi.  It has been documented that this pathogenic 
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bacterium has been isolated from activated sewage sludges (Leal-Klevezas et al. 2005).  
Ochrobactrum anthropi is also phylogenetically related to bacteria in the Brucella genus. 
The concentration method was shown to improve the detection of bacteria.  The 
screening results for Brucella were negative for the unconcentrated Secondary Effluent sample.  
By concentrating the sample 250-fold, the bacterium that cross-reacts with the Brucella primers 
was able to be detected by the PCR.  There was no confirmation of Brucella spp. and/or 
Ochrobactrum anthropi in the unconcentrated sample.  In comparing these two instances, the 
concentration of the secondary effluent allowed for the improved detection of this pathogenic 
bacteria. 
It was observed that the number of positive results decreased for the wastewater samples.  
The primary effluent yielded four positive results, while the mixed liquor had two confirmations, 
and none was present in the secondary effluent.  An explanation for this phenomenon is that 
concentration of Ochrobactrum anthropi decreases through each stage of wastewater treatment 
based on the PCR results of the screening tests.  While the screening assays were not used to 
quantitatively analyze the samples, the sensitivity of the PCR is dependent of the concentration 
of target DNA, and therefore the bacterial concentration of the sample.  This reduction in 
bacterial concentration could be due to protozoa grazing and the target bacteria settling in the 
sludge of each stage, both resulting in the removal of bacteria from the sample streams.  The 
three positive results of the concentrated secondary effluent screening assays indicated that the 
bacteria was not completely removed during treatment but were reduced to levels that could not 
be detected by the PCR in the initial screening tests. 
During the initial screening of pathogens, many samples had positive results for 
pathogens that should not be present in the sample, and a number of negative controls returned a 
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positive result.  This trend was most apparent for the Millique water samples, where the water is 
passed through a number of filters to ensure that it is distilled and deionized.  Data logs were sent 
to IdahoTech to be analyzed to determine the problem; and it was found that there was a large 
amount of contaminant DNA present within the system.  According to IdahoTech, this 
contamination led to the false positives during data analysis.  Contamination could have been 
due to improper disposal procedures for the DNA samples once amplified and the thermocycler 
carousal being exposed to amplicon due to broken capillaries during placement and removal.  
Because DNA can persist for years without degrading, decontamination steps were taken per 
IdahoTech’s instructions using DNAZap (Ambion, Inc.), two acidic solutions that are able to 
degrade nucleic acids.  This decontamination process, along with changing the location of the 
three stations for the DNA extraction, sample preparation, and sample amplification, helped to 
ensure that further samples would not become contaminated.  The hood specifically designed for 
PCR sample preparation was also purchased to ensure a clean workspace to reconstitute the 
reagents.  The PCR hood is also equipped with UV light, which is able to dimerize nucleotide 
bases, thus making the DNA unable to replicate during the PCR process. 
4.2.2 Phase II – Detection Limits of Salmonella in River Water and Wastewater Matrices 
Four samples, river water and three wastewater components, were spiked with Salmonella 
typhimurium, and analyzed using the culture and PCR technique.  The results, presented in Table 
4.3, compared the detection limits of each procedure.  The detection limits of the culture 
technique for each water sample were determined by plate counts done for each of the dilutions.  
The PCR detection limits were determined by analyzing the DNA of each of the dilutions with 
the Salmonella spp. assay kit.  The lowest dilution at which there was a positive result was 
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compared to the same dilution in the plate counts.  From the results of the plating, the bacterial 
concentration of the dilution could be calculated. 
Table 4.3.  Salmonella typhimurium detection limits comparison of using culturing and PCR 
  
Salmonella Detection 
Limits (cfu/mL) 
Water Sample Date Culture PCR 
River Water 8/24/2006 100 1.42 x 105
River Water 9/13/2006 45 5.5 x 105
Primary Effluent 10/6/2006 45 2.10 x 104
Mixed Liquor 10/20/2006 1200* 4.00 x 103
Secondary 
Effluent 9/22/2006 40 2.20 x 105
* Plating of the mixed liquor samples led to severe overgrowth.  This 
was smallest number of colonies counted where counts were possible. 
 
By comparing the results of culturing and PCR, this table demonstrates that the traditional 
method of culturing Salmonella is far more sensitive than the PCR technique.  Typical detection 
limits ranged from 103 to 105 CFU/mL for the PCR, while plating allowed bacteria to be detected 
at much lower levels, ranging from 40 to 1200 cfu/mL.  Both methods allow for detection of 
Salmonella at levels lower than its median infective dose of 104 to 105 organisms, with the 
culture method being much more sensitive with respect to screening pathogens for public health 
purposes.  In the event of intentional contamination and threats of such contamination, a 24-hour 
incubation time may be too long to determine a pathogen’s presence when time is of the essence.  
Less than two hours are required to complete the DNA extraction and analysis for the 
R.A.P.I.D.® PCR.  This timeframe will be much more imperative if more virulent species are 
under consideration. 
One potential drawback with using PCR to detect virulent species is that the detection 
limits of the device may be well above the median infection dose.  Some pathogens, such as 
anthrax spores, have very low infectious doses, and their detection by PCR may not be suitable 
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for public health needs.  In this case, the culture technique may be more desirable in the 
detection of these species. 
Typical culturing of Salmonella requires the use of selective enrichment or plating media 
that allows for the isolation of colonies in samples of mixed microbial flora.  To use nutrient 
broth agar plating media, the wastewater samples were autoclaved to kill off bacteria present, so 
that the presence of their colonies would not skew the results of the plate counts.  The autoclave 
time was reduced to 5 minutes, from a standard runtime of 20 minutes, to prevent scaling on the 
glassware.  There were no problems with the plate counts for the majority of the samples, but 
problems did arise with the plating of the straight samples from the serial dilutions of the mixed 
liquor sample.  There was significant growth on these plates due to the direct plating of the flocs 
present in mixed liquor.  Because of the large quantities of bacteria present in mixed liquor, 
especially in the flocs, the autoclave time was not long enough to inactivate the bacteria.  The 
colonies on these plates also had a different appearance than those of Salmonella typhimurium.  
The higher dilution plates did not have this issue, possibly because the mixed liquor bacteria 
remained in the flocs while the Salmonella remained in the free liquid. 
The detection limits of Salmonella in river water and the secondary effluent were similar 
in order of magnitude, with an average detection limit of 1.40 x 105 cfu/mL in river water and 
2.20 x 105 cfu/mL in chlorinated secondary effluent.   There was a decline in the detection limits 
of the primary effluent and mixed liquor samples, by one order and two orders of magnitude, 
respectively.  This may be due to interferences in these two samples that may not be as prevalent 
in the other two samples.  Humic and fulvic acids can have a two-prong effect on the 
effectiveness of the PCR.  These substances have been shown to inhibit polymerase activity at 
high concentrations (Tsai and Olson 1992).  Humic acids can also interfere with the fluorescent 
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signals of the thermocycler as these compounds are spectrally active and will become excited at 
the wavelengths used for detection (Zipper et al. 2003). 
Humic and fulvic acids result from the decomposition of organic matter.  They occur in 
natural waters and, due to the nature of wastewater treatment, in the effluents and mixed liquor.  
The secondary treatment process is where the majority of the decomposition of organic matter 
occurs.  Because of this phenomenon, humic and fulvic acids would be a significant component 
of the slurry.  The detection limit of Salmonella in this matrix was 4.00 x 103 CFU/mL, about a 
1000-fold difference from the concentrations from river water and secondary effluent assays 
(Table 4.4).  The results of primary effluent tests had an order of magnitude difference, 2.10 x 
104 CFU/mL.  Both samples show that there is a substantial amount of humic and fulvic acids in 
each; enough to affect the readings of the R.A.P.I.D.® PCR.  The results show that the mixed 
liquor sample would have the highest concentration of these substances, followed by the primary 
effluent.  While humic and fulvic acids would be present in both streams, these decomposition 
products would be higher in the mixed liquor, where biological processes are the primary means 
of waste removal, as opposed to primary treatment, which depends on physical phenomena. 
Table 4.4.  Detection limits of PCR for unconcentrated samples 
 
Salmonella Detection 
Limits (cfu/mL) 
Water Sample PCR 
River Water 1.42 x 105
River Water 5.5 x 105
Primary Effluent 2.10 x 104
Mixed Liquor 4.00 x 103
Secondary 
Effluent 2.20 x 105
 
The second step of the DNA extraction process, the ethanol wash step, is used to remove 
the humic and fulvic acid interferences.  A volume of 550 μL is added to the spin filter and 
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passed through via centrifugation.  This quantity may be suitable to remove small quantities of 
humic and fulvic acids from an assay, but because of the nature of many environmental samples, 
a larger volume may be needed to get more accurate results via PCR. 
4.2.3 Phase III – Detection Limits of Salmonella in River Water and Secondary Effluent 
using a Concentration Method 
Two samples, river water and secondary effluent, were concentrated through a 0.45-μm filter to 
determine improvements in Salmonella recovery and detection in both culture and PCR analyses.  
Due to the high turbidities of the samples, only 500 mL of river water and 250 mL of secondary 
effluent were able to be filtered.  Filtered products for both samples were reconstituted to 2 mL.  
This resulted in a 250- and 125-fold volume reduction and 2.40 and 2.10 theoretical log 
reduction, respectively. 
  To determine the effectiveness of the concentration method, the log difference was 
calculated for each dilution by comparing the unconcentrated and concentrated plate counts.  The 
average log recovery for the river water sample was 2.11 log units, while the Salmonella 
recovery in the secondary effluent was 1.41 log units.  Both recoveries were below the 
theoretical recovery of the concentration method.  This phenomenon may result from bacteria 
adhering to glassware and the filtration device.  Also, all the cells trapped on the membrane filter 
may not have been removed during the elution process. 
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 Table 4.5.  Evaluation of the Concentration Method Using PCR and Culture 
  
Unconcentrated 
Sample Salmonella 
Detection Limits 
(cfu/mL) 
Concentrated Sample 
Salmonella Detection 
Limits (cfu/mL) 
Improvement in detection 
following concentration  
(log units) 
Water Sample Date Culture PCR Culture PCR Culture PCR 
River Water 
(250x) 12/9/2006 60 2.70 x 105 0.60 80 2.00 3.53 
Secondary 
Effluent (125x) 12/20/2006 20 3.50 x 103 0.63 20 1.50 2.24 
 
The detection limits of the concentration process were determined by finding the concentrated 
sample dilution that was detectable by both culturing and PCR.  These results were then 
compared to the plate count results of the unconcentrated sample to determine at what 
Salmonella concentration in the original sample could be detected by concentration (Table 4.5).  
After concentration, the PCR detection limits of the river water and secondary effluent were 
within the same order of magnitude, 80 and 20 cfu/mL, respectively.  These findings were 
compared to detection limits of the unconcentrated samples, which were found to be 2.70 x 105 
cfu/mL for river water and 3.50 x 103 cfu/mL for the wastewater matrix.  The disparity in the 
detection limits in the two unconcentrated samples can possibly be attributed to interferences 
(primarily humic and fulvic acids) that may be in higher concentrations in the secondary effluent.  
These would lead to positive PCR readings at lower dilutions, thus allowing for a smaller 
number of organisms to be detected by the PCR fluorescence. 
 The improvement in Salmonella detection was calculated by determining how many log 
units recovery occured with the concentration method.  In comparing the results of culturing the 
concentrate to the average log recovery observed from plating, the recovery of cells was not 
aided or abetted significantly.  There was very little difference between the log units of the 
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average cell recovery and those numbers calculated for the concentration method, and both were 
well below the theoretical cell recovery in log units. 
 The concentration method displayed a marked improvement in Salmonella detection by 
PCR.  The log improvement for both samples was greater than the theoretical log recovery via 
concentration.  The improvement in detection for river water following concentration was 3.53 
log units, over a 1-log improvement than the theoretical.  The improvement in recovery for the 
secondary effluent was only 0.14 log units greater than the theoretical, but the difference 
between the two samples can be attributed to the lower unconcentrated PCR detection limit of 
the secondary effluent.  One possible explanation for greater log-unit recovery may be that the 
membrane filter collected both live and dead cells.  This phenomenon would not affect the 
cultured concentrates, because this technique would only take into account viable cells.  Because 
DNA does not degrade readily in the environment, the dead cells concentrated in the sample 
would also contribute to the PCR results.  This would account for a portion of the improvement 
of recovery in the concentrated sample. 
 The concentration method for both samples has the ability to detect Salmonella at levels 
of public health significance.  The literature suggests that the median infective dose can be a 
little 15-20 cells and as many as 105 organisms (Burrows and Renner 1999).  These numbers 
apply to the ingestion of the microorganisms, but pathogens may be more immediately 
incapacitating when inhaled.  This property would be more pertinent in a wastewater treatment 
plant, where pathogens can be easily aerosolized, but the likelihood of ingestion is highly 
improbable.  Select agents, such as B. anthracis and Y. pestis, can be and have been aerosolized 
for weapons use in the past.  The detection limits of these bacteria could not be researched due to 
safety concerns and legal restrictions.  The size of the Salmonella typhimurium bacterium (0.5 x 
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2.5 μm) is comparable to that of B. anthracis spores (0.8 x 1.5-1.8 μm) and Y. pestis organisms 
(0.5-1.0 x 1-2 μm).  The membrane filter used for concentration has 0.45 μm pores, making it 
able to trap these pathogens as well.  Due to the virulence of these species, concentration at the 
volumes tested may not be sufficient enough to bring detection to within public health standards.  
With increased volumes though, the concentration method in tandem with PCR should improve 
detection in the event of intentional or accidental contamination. 
 55 
5.0  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Prioritization of contaminants can prove to be a useful tool for wastewater treatment authorities.  
It will provide these utilities with a basis of which contaminants would pose the greatest threat to 
treatment plants and their collection systems.  Screening methods can be then developed and 
implemented to rapidly detect these threats to plant security and safety in the event of a 
contamination incident.  The prioritization can also aid in the development of contingency plans 
for treatment and remediation, if necessary.  The information in data sheets may also provide 
guidance in ways to decontaminate affected systems. 
Real-time rapid cycle PCR is one such method that can be used by wastewater utilities to 
effectively and efficiently screen for pathogens that may be introduced into a treatment system.  
While selective culturing may be the most accurate in determining the presence of pathogens, 
PCR analysis in tandem with the concentration method may aid in screening for bacteria at levels 
of public health significance.  This technique may be particularly useful for the detection of 
Select Agents, such as Bacillus anthracis (one of the highest-ranking contaminants according to 
the prioritization), which require special laboratory biosafety requirements for culturing.  
Screening for Brucella spp. in wastewater may still require culturing for confirmation due to 
bacteria ubiquitous in treatment processes, whose DNA cross-reacts with primers of Brucella 
spp. during the PCR process.  The further development of primers that prevent this cross-reaction 
will be necessary for PCR’s use in the of Brucella spp. in the future, but is outside the scope of 
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this paper.  The concentration method was applied to Salmonella typhimurium, but it is 
anticipated to be applicable for other types of bacteria and protozoa, given that the cells are 
larger than the filter pore size used.  The PCR detection limits of the concentrated sample 
exceeded that expected due to the reduction in volume.  This method can also be easily used 
onsite due to the apparatus’s light weight and portability, making it a viable option in field 
operations.  If necessary, larger volumes could be concentrated to improve pathogen detection, 
but may require more time for filtration.  In situations where intentional contamination may be 
suspected, the concentration method along with real-time rapid cycle PCR will provide essential 
preliminary screening that will aid in protecting public health, wastewater treatment plant 
processes and infrastructure, and wildlife that may inhabit the surrounding area and live in the 
receiving waters. 
Acts of terrorism and natural disasters can be equally destructive to critical infrastructure 
(e.g., water treatment and distribution systems and wastewater collection and treatment systems).  
The prioritization of contaminants will provide emergency response teams with the tools 
necessary to determine which contaminants would be a priority for screening purposes.  The 
framework may also provide emergency responders with data to mitigate the effects of 
contaminants on wastewater treatment and collection systems.  The use of real-time rapid cycle 
PCR will allow emergency responders to quickly identify if and what type of biological agents 
are present, so that the proper remediation efforts are enacted.  These efforts will bolster the 
protection of vital infrastructure and help prevent irreversible damage to wastewater treatment 
processes and structures and ensure the health of the surrounding community. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTAMINANTS EVALUATED USING THE PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK 
The following list of contaminants was evaluated using the prioritization framework developed 
for wastewater.  The contaminants were divided into rounds for ease of evaluation. 
 
Round 1  
o Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 
o Cesium-137 
o Cyanide Salts 
o Ethylene Glycol 
o Gasoline 
o Malathion 
o Paraquat 
 
Round 2  
o Ammonia 
o Arsenic 
o Botulinum Toxin 
o Hexane 
o Kerosene 
o Phenol 
o Strontium-90 
 
Round 3  
o Acetone 
o Aldicarb 
o Brucella suis 
o Chlorine Dioxide 
o Cobalt-60 
Round 3 (continued) 
o Mercury 
o Sodium Hypochlorite 
o Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B 
 
Round 4  
o Benzene 
o Ethylbenzene 
o Fuel Oils 
o m-Xylene 
o o-Xylene 
o p-Xylene 
o Pentane 
o Toluene 
 
Round 5  
o Americium-241 
o Calcium Hypochlorite 
o Cyclohexanol 
o DDT 
o Glycerine 
o Lead 
o Nitrobenzene 
o Paraformaldehyde 
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Round 6 (Class 1A Flammables)  Round 7 (continued) 
o 1,1-Dichloroethylene o n-Butyl Acetate 
o Ethylamine o Octane 
o Ethyl Chloride o Propyl Acetate 
o Ethyl Ether o sec-Butyl Acetate 
o Isopentane o tert-Amyl Alcohol 
o Isopropyl Chloride o tert-Butyl Acetate 
o Methyl Formate o VM&P Naphtha 
o Propylene Oxide  
Round 8 (VA Tech Process Upset)   
o 1-Chloro-2,4-Dinitrobenzene Round 7 (Class 1B Flammables)  
o 1,2-Dichloroethylene o 1-Octanol 
o Carbon Disulfide o 2,4-Dinitrophenol 
o Ethyl Acetate o Cadmium 
o Ethyl Alcohol o Cyclohexanone 
o Isoamyl Acetate o Dichloromethane 
 o Isoamyl Alcohol 
o Isobutyl Acetate Round 9 
o Isopropyl Acetate o Isophorone 
o Isopropyl Alcohol o Plutonium-238 
o Methyl Acetate o Styrene 
o Methyl Alcohol o Sulfuric Acid 
o Methyl Ethyl Ketone o Turpentine 
o Methyl Propyl Ketone o VX 
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APPENDIX B 
PRIORITIZATION ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CONTAMINANTS 
The following tables provide an example of the application of the prioritization framework.  The 
contaminants chosen are the top two most hazardous for each endpoint according to the 
prioritization.  Each table has comments specific to the contaminant for each criterion with 
respect to the endpoint in question.  The criterion score is based on these comments in cojunction 
with the prioritization framework. 
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Table B.1.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to C.  botulinum with respect to the Worker/Public Health 
Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.18 2
Potency 0.16 5
Persistence 0.04 4
Introduction/Dispersion 0.04 5
Process Removal 0.02 3
Storability 0.04 5
Outcomes 0.28 5
Public Perception 0.24 5
4.39
Comments: BT01
BT02
BT03
http://www.idsociety.org/Template.cfm?Section=Botulism1&CONTENTID=11058&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.
cfm
WCIT Profile for Botulinum toxin
BT02 Spores are readily killed by chlorine (either as chlorinated water or as hypochlorite).  Spores are 
resistant to ultraviolet light.  BT03A reverse osmosis field study reported >99.988% removal of 
botulinum toxin from raw water spiked with the toxin.  Treatment systems using charcoal should 
effectively remove the toxin.  Botulinum toxins are inactivated by 0.5% hypochlorite for 10-15 minutes. 
Botulinum toxins are > 99.7% inactivated by 3 mg/L free available chlorine in 20 minutes, and are 
84% inactivated by 0.4 mg/L free available chlorine in 20 minutes.
Composite Score
BT02Spores are resistant to dessication and can survive for years in a dry state.
BT02The fatality rate for food borne botulism is 5-10% and 15-44% for wound botulism.  It is assumed 
that similar rates would exist for inhalation of botulinum toxin.
Exotic substance linked to terrorist activities.
Comments
Worker/Public Health
BT01Clostridium Botulinum  is a spore forming obligat whose natural habitat is the soil and can be 
easily isolated.  Iraq has admitted to producing 19,000 L of botulinum toxin.  This amount constitutes 
more than three times the amount needed to kill the current human population.
BT02Lethal dose for a 70 kg person is estimated to be between 0.7 and 0.9 μg/kg for inhalation.
Easily introduced and dispersed into the wastewater collection and treatment system.  No special 
equipment is required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/8/1059
BT02Spores may survive boiling for up to 4 hours.  Botulinum toxin is inactivated in fresh water within 3 
to 6 days.
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Table B.2.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to VX with respect to the Worker/Public Health Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.18 2
Potency 0.16 5
Persistence 0.04 5
Introduction/Dispersion 0.04 2
Process Removal 0.02 5
Storability 0.04 5
Outcomes 0.28 5
Public Perception 0.24 5
4.33
Comments: VX01
VX02
VX03
VX04
VX05
VX06
VX07
VX08
VX09
VX10
VX11
VX12
VX13
VX14 WCIT Profile for VX
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/EnvironmentNewsService/2005/05/23/868464?extID=10026
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309060435/html/
Ed. Pohanish, Richard P.  Sittig's Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens, Fourth Edition.  
2002.
http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/rtkweb/2673.pdf
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/mmg166.html
http://www.cbwinfo.com/Chemical/Nerve/VX.shtml
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/
http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/factsheets/vx_nerve_agent.htm
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/erc50782-69-9.asp
http://www.ilpi.com/msds/vx.html
Comments
Worker/Public Health
VX01VX is a man-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent.  It is an odorless, tasteless, 
boily liquid that is amber in color.  Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of known chemical 
warefare agents.  They are similar to pesticides called organophosphates in how they work and what kinds 
of harmful effects are caused.  It was originally developed in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s and is 
not found naturally in the environment.  VX02It is stated that VX is produced in a manner very similar to that 
of modern phosphorous-based pesticides today, and therefore is extremely easy to manufacture.  Anyone 
creating modern pesticides could be secretly producing VX liquid.  VX03They are known to be stored by 
several nations, including the U.S.  VX09The U.S. stopped production and shipment of the chemical agent 
i th l t 1960VX03The airborne exposure limit (as recommended by the Surgeon General's Working Group, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services) is 0.003 μg/m3 TWA for the workplace.  VX04The TLV (U.S. 
military) and VX05airborne exposure limit TWA ("DA Pam 40-8, Occupational Health Guidelines for the 
Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to Nerve Agents GA, GB, GD, and VX") are both 
0.00001 mg/m3.  VX06The estimated inhalational LCt50 for humans has been stated as 10 and 
VX0730-50 mg-
min/m3.  VX06As little as one drop of VX on the skin can be fatal.
VX09The Chemical Weapons Convention requires destruction of chemical weapons by 2007.  The Army is 
proposing to pretreat stockpiles of VX nerve agent at its Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in 
Newport, Indiana, and then transport the resulting hydrolysate across the country to the DuPont Chambers 
Works facility at Carney's Point, Salem County, NJ for final treatment and disposal into the Delaware 
River.  VX10This DuPont facility is the largest commercial wastewater treatment facility in North America.  
There, DuPont proposes to treat the wastewater from the neutralization of the VX nerve agent with a new 
patented wastewater treatment technology using powdered activated carbon.  VX11Limited pilot-scale 
testing has demonstrated the ability of supercritical water oxidation to achieve high destruction efficiencies 
for the organic constituents of VX hydrolysate.  VX04Oxidation using common bleach and superchlorinated 
bleach is also said to decontaminate.  VX04The estimated log Kow is 2.06.
VX12For emergency situations, wear a "moon suit" consisting of a positive pressure, pressure-demand, full-
facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or a pressure-demand supplied air respirator SCBA 
with escape cylinder in combination with a fully-encapuslating, chemical resistant suit capable of 
maintaining a positive air pressure within the suit.  VX07Masks, including self-contained breathing apparatus 
masks, alone do not previde adequate protection against VX.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/basics/facts.asp
http://www.milnet.com/chembio.htm
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsd4.html
VX08If released into water, VX is expected to adsorb to suspended solids and sediment.  Based on its pKa, 
VX will exist in the protonated state in the environment and cations generally adsorb to organic carbon 
more readily.  Volatilization from water surfaces is not expected to be an important fate process.  It will 
decompose slowly by hydrolysis, particularly at low temperatures.  Recent experiments at 21°C, gave a pH 
independent hydrolytic half-life of 57 days.  Earlier results had indicated that the hydrolysis was base-
catalyzed.  VX04The hydrolysis products of VX include EA2192, which is nearly as toxic as VX and is 
hydrolysed over 1,000 times more slowly.  Its solubility in water is 30 g/L at 25°C.
Composite Score
VX12VX should be stored in tightly closed containers in a cool, well-ventilated area away from heat.  VX04It is 
relatively stable at room temperature.  Unstabilized VX of 95% purity decomposes at a rate of 5% per 
month at 71°C.  At pH 12, the toxic by-product has a half-life of about 14 days; in 90 days there is about a 
64-fold reduction.
VX04VX is on the Superfund Extremely Dangerous Substances List.  It is a lethal cholinesterase inhibitor in 
liquid or vapor form.  There is only a slight difference between a mild and fatal doses.  Symptoms from 
inhalation may occur within minutes or hours.  Skin and eye exposure cause a very rapid onset of 
symptoms.  Death usually occurs within 15 minutes after absorption of a fatal dose.  VX03In general, the 
manifestation of toxic effects is fastest via inhalation or ingestion.  Manifestation of nerve agent exposure 
includes runny nose, chest tightness, pinpoint pupils, shortness of breath, excessive salivation and 
sweating, nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, muscle twitching, 
confusion, seizures, paralysis, coma, respiratory paralysis, and death.  Incapacitating effects occur within 
1 to 10 minutes and fatal effects within 4 to 18 hours.  Fatigue, irritability, nervousness, and memory 
defects may persist for as long as 6 weeks.  VX07Immediate treatment includes intravenous or 
intramuscular injection of 2 mg atropine sulfate.  This should be followed by additional injections of atropine
VX07VX was synthesized and used by the Aum Shinrikyo organization in various attacks throughout Japan 
in the Nineties.  It is an exotic substance linked to terrorist activities.
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Table B.3.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to Malathion with respect to the Process Upset Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.24 5
Potency 0.11 5
Persistence 0.10 4
Introduction/Dispersion 0.11 5
Process Removal 0.09 2
Storability 0.07 5
Outcomes 0.26 4
Public Perception 0.02 2
4.31
Comments: MA01
MA02
MA03
MA04
MA05 http://www.knovel.com
http://www.hazard.com/msds/mf/cards/file/0172.html
www.epa.gov/pesticides/op/malathion/efedresp.pdf
MA05The aerobic biodegradation half-time was 0.05 days with an initial concentration of 2 mg/L using a 
mixture of nonacclimated sludge, field soil, and river sediment as inoculum.  Activated carbon and 
calcium hypochlorite are also effective for removal with 90% and 100% removal, respectively.
http://www.speclab.com/compound/c121755.htm
Comments
Process Upset
MA01Malathion is a widely used organophosphate insecticide.
MA05An IC0 of 10 mg/L can inhibit nitrification and denitrifcation (rotating disc and activated sludge).
MA03Malathion's rapid degradation in soils with high microbial activity and many water bodies results in 
reduced environmental exposures relative to other organophosphate insecticides.  MA04Hydrolysis half-
life ranges from ~1.5 days at pH 8 and up to 21 weeks at pH 6.  In raw river water, 90% of malathion 
was biologically degraded within two weeks.  MA02No solubility in water.
Easily introduced and dispersed into the wastewater collection and treatment system.  No special 
equipment is required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pel88/121-75.html
Composite Score
MA02Keep in a well-ventilated room.  Malathion reacts violently with strong oxidants and can attack 
iron, some plastics and rubber.
Malathion may disrupt some tertiary treatment processes.  Remediation may be necessary.
Malathion is a common substance not linked to terrorist activities.
 
Table B.4.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to Mercury with respect to the Process Upset Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.24 5
Potency 0.11 3
Persistence 0.10 5
Introduction/Dispersion 0.11 5
Process Removal 0.09 2
Storability 0.07 5
Outcomes 0.26 4
Public Perception 0.02 3
4.22
Comments: ME01
ME02
ME03
ME04
Composite Score
HG05Mercury must be stored to avoid contact with chloride dioxide, nitric acid, nitrates, ethylene oxide, 
chlorine and methylazide to prevent violent reactions.  It should be stored in a cool, well-ventilated 
area.
There has been no documented incidents of process upset, but mercury does react violently chlorine 
and chlorine dioxide, two common disinfectants.  The effects are expected to be manageable.  There 
could be possible alteration with the treatment process.
Mercury is a common substance not linked to terrorist activities, however there is public awareness 
regarding its presence in drinking waters and bioaccumulation in fish.
Comments
Process Upset
HG01Mercury is a naturally occuring metal found in various forms.  HG05It is a silvery, mobile, odorless 
liquid, that is HG06the byproduct of cinnabar ore mining and gold extraction projects.  Elemental 
metallic mercury is used to produce chlorine gas and caustic soda, and is also used in thermometers, 
dental fillings, and batteries.  Methyl mercury is mainly produced by bacteria in soil and water and 
HG08has no practical use.  HG08Most products containing inorganic mercury compounds have been 
banned.
Unknown.
HG01Methyl mercury may be formed in water and soil by bacteria.  Increased amounts of elemental 
mercury in the environment will increase the amount of methyl mercury produced.  Methyl mercury is 
considered much more toxic than inorganic forms of mercury.  ME02Mercury is not soluble in water.  Its 
vapor pressure is 0.26 Pa at 20oC.
Easily introduced and dispersed into the wastewater collection and treatment system.  No special 
equipment is required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.  HG07The EPA requires the reporting 
of mercury spills or releases of 1 pound or more.
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts46.html
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng/neng0056.html
http://www.rwaterguy.com/removal_of_mercury_from_wastewat.htm
HG03Mercury can be precipitated to low levels using carbonate, phosphate, or sulfide.  Metallic 
mercury is soluble in water at 25 μg/L which is above the regulatory limit.  Mercury can be removed 
with ion exchange.  Granulated carbon is often used to polish treated solutions with varying success.  
HG04Average % removal by: Primary Treatment - 10%, Activated sludge - 60%, Trickling filter - 50%, 
and Tertiary Treatment - 67%.
U.S. EPA's Guidance Manual on the Development and Implementation of Local Discharger Limitations Under 
the Pretreatment Program , December1987, 3-58  
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Table B.5.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to VX with respect to the Physical Damage and Destruction 
Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.16 2
Potency 0.06 3
Persistence 0.05 5
Introduction/Dispersion 0.06 2
Process Removal 0.04 5
Storability 0.02 5
Outcomes 0.32 5
Public Perception 0.29 5
4.23
Comments: VX01
VX02
VX03
VX04
VX05
VX06
VX07
VX08
VX09
VX10
VX11
VX12
VX13
VX14 WCIT Profile for VX
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/EnvironmentNewsService/2005/05/23/868464?extID=10026
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309060435/html/
Ed. Pohanish, Richard P.  Sittig's Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens, Fourth 
Edition.  2002.
http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/rtkweb/2673.pdf
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/mmg166.html
http://www.cbwinfo.com/Chemical/Nerve/VX.shtml
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/
http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/factsheets/vx_nerve_agent.htm
Composite Score
VX12VX should be stored in tightly closed containers in a cool, well-ventilated area away from heat.  
VX04It is relatively stable at room temperature.  Unstabilized VX of 95% purity decomposes at a rate of 
5% per month at 71°C.  At pH 12, the toxic by-product has a half-life of about 14 days; in 90 days 
there is about a 64-fold reduction.
VX12VX may burn, but it does not readily ignite.  VX12Poisonous gases including oxides of nitrogen and 
sulfur are produced in fire.  Vapors are heavier than air and will collect in low areas.  This chemical 
should be kept out of a confined space, such as a sewer, because of the possibility of explosion.  All 
ignition sources should be removed.  VX14VX is considered an infrastructure threat because of its high 
toxicity combined with its ability to adhere to infrastructure surfaces and its ability to corrode metals.
VX07VX was synthesized and used by the Aum Shinrikyo organization in various attacks throughout 
Japan in the Nineties.  It is an exotic substance linked to terrorist activities.
http://www.ilpi.com/msds/vx.html
http://www.milnet.com/chembio.htm
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsd4.html
Comments
Physical Damage/Destruction
VX01VX is a man-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent.  It is an odorless, 
tasteless, boily liquid that is amber in color.  Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of 
known chemical warefare agents.  They are similar to pesticides called organophosphates in how 
they work and what kinds of harmful effects are caused.  It was originally developed in the United 
Kingdom in the early 1950s and is not found naturally in the environment.  VX02It is stated that VX is 
produced in a manner very similar to that of modern phosphorous-based pesticides today, and 
therefore is extremely easy to manufacture.  Anyone creating modern pesticides could be secretly 
producing VX liquid.  VX03They are known to be stored by several nations, including the U.S.  VX09The 
U.S. stopped production and shipment of the chemical agent in the late 1960s.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/erc50782-69-9.asp
VX05VX has a flash point of 159°C.  VX12The boiling point is 298°C (decomposition).  Explosive limits 
have not been documented.
VX08If released into water, VX is expected to adsorb to suspended solids and sediment.  Based on its 
pKa, VX will exist in the protonated state in the environment and cations generally adsorb to organic 
carbon more readily.  Volatilization from water surfaces is not expected to be an important fate 
process.  It will decompose slowly by hydrolysis, particularly at low temperatures.  Recent 
experiments at 21°C, gave a pH independent hydrolytic half-life of 57 days.  Earlier results had 
indicated that the hydrolysis was base-catalyzed.  VX04The hydrolysis products of VX include EA2192, 
which is nearly as toxic as VX and is hydrolysed over 1,000 times more slowly.  Its solubility in water 
i 30 /L t 25°CVX12For emergency situations, wear a "moon suit" consisting of a positive pressure, pressure-demand, 
full-facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or a pressure-demand supplied air 
respirator SCBA with escape cylinder in combination with a fully-encapuslating, chemical resistant suit
capable of maintaining a positive air pressure within the suit.  VX07Masks, including self-contained 
breathing apparatus masks, alone do not previde adequate protection against VX.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/basics/facts.asp
VX09The Chemical Weapons Convention requires destruction of chemical weapons by 2007.  The 
Army is proposing to pretreat stockpiles of VX nerve agent at its Newport Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility in Newport, Indiana, and then transport the resulting hydrolysate across the country to the 
DuPont Chambers Works facility at Carney's Point, Salem County, NJ for final treatment and disposal 
into the Delaware River.  VX10This DuPont facility is the largest commercial wastewater treatment 
facility in North America.  There, DuPont proposes to treat the wastewater from the neutralization of 
the VX nerve agent with a new patented wastewater treatment technology using powdered activated 
carbon.  VX11Limited pilot-scale testing has demonstrated the ability of supercritical water oxidation to 
achieve high destruction efficiencies for the organic constituents of VX hydrolysate.  VX04Oxidation 
using common bleach and superchlorinated bleach is also said to decontaminate.  VX04The estimated 
log Kow is 2 06
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Table B.6.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to Bacillus anthracis with respect to the Physical Damage 
and Destruction Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.16 3
Potency 0.06 4
Persistence 0.05 5
Introduction/Dispersion 0.06 5
Process Removal 0.04 3
Storability 0.02 5
Outcomes 0.32 4
Public Perception 0.29 5
4.22
Comments:
AX01
AX02 WaterISAC
AX03 www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/cieslak.htm
AX04 WCIT Profile for Anthrax
Composite Score
Physical Damage/Destruction
AX01Since Anthrax is an animal disease that may occur in many parts of  the world, soil samples may 
make anthrax readily available at numerous locations worldwide.  Additionally, approximately 1,500 
international microbiological repositories sell anthrax cultures.  Bacillus anthracis  can be produced 
with common biological production equipment.
AX01Anthrax spores can remain viable for two years.  The spores have been known to remain viable 
for decades in aqueous environments.
Exotic substance linked to terrorist activities. Much public fear exists regarding anthrax following the 
anthrax attacks on the USMail in 2001.
Davis, J., Johnson-Wingar, A.  The Anthrax Terror DOD's Number-One Biological Threat   Aerospace Power 
Journal  Winter 2000
Comments
Easily introduced and dispersed into the wastewater collection and treatment system. No equipment 
is required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.
Specific remediation procedures for a wastewater collection and treatment system are not in the open 
literature. Over 80 million dollars was spent on the remediation of one post office to remediate the 
anthrax mail attacks in 2001.
Spores are resistant to chlorine. Sodium hypochlorite as a sporicide is applicable under an 
emergency exemption: The sporicidal effectiveness of hypochlorite solutions depends on the 
concentration of free available chlorine and pH. (1) Chemical Sterilization: Method: Free available 
chlorine. Concentration: 2.4 -2.3 mg/L available Cl2, pH 7.2, 22°C. Inoculum size: 1.1 x 10^5 spore 
suspension of B. anthracis. Time: 1 hour. Efficiency: >99.99 % killed (1 spore/mL survived). (2) 
Chemical Sterilization: Method: Sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl). Concentration: 0.05 %, pH 7.0, 20°C. 
Inoculum Size: Spore suspension of B. subtilius globigii, representing 1.6 - 2.2 x 10^9 CFU/mL. Time: 
30 minutes. Efficiency: 99.99 % killed. (3) Chemical Sterilization: Chlorine dioxide (ClO2). 
Concentration: 6-7 mg/L, 20% -40% RH, 23°C. Inoculum sixe: 10^6 spores/biologic indicator.
AX01Anthrax spores can remain viable for years.  The spores have been known to remain viable for 
decades in aqueous environments.
Serious effects expected.  Treatment plant/ collection system is destroyed or inactivated. 
Remediation would be required to remove or inactivate the spores. Specific remediation procedures 
for a wastewater collection and treatment system are not in the open literature. Over 80 million dollars 
was spent on the remediation of one post office to remediate the anthrax mail attacks in 2001.
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Table B.7.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to VX with respect to the Pass Through Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.03 2
Potency 0.06 5
Persistence 0.16 5
Introduction/Dispersion 0.03 2
Process Removal 0.16 5
Storability 0.03 5
Outcomes 0.20 5
Public Perception 0.33 5
4.83
Comments: VX01
VX02
VX03
VX04
VX05
VX06
VX07
VX08
VX09
VX10
VX11
VX12
VX13
VX14 WCIT Profile for VX
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/EnvironmentNewsService/2005/05/23/868464?extID=10026
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309060435/html/
Ed. Pohanish, Richard P.  Sittig's Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens, Fourth Editio
http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/rtkweb/2673.pdf
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/erc50782-69-9.asp
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsd4.html
http://www.ilpi.com/msds/vx.html
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/mmg166.html
http://www.cbwinfo.com/Chemical/Nerve/VX.shtml
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/
http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/factsheets/vx_nerve_agent.htm
Composite Score
VX12VX should be stored in tightly closed containers in a cool, well-ventilated area away from heat.  
VX04It is relatively stable at room temperature.  Unstabilized VX of 95% purity decomposes at a rate of 
5% per month at 71°C.  At pH 12, the toxic by-product has a half-life of about 14 days; in 90 days 
there is about a 64-fold reduction.
VX08It is suggested that the potential for bioconcentration in aquatic organisms is low.  VX12If material 
or contaminated runoff enters waterways, notify downstream users of potentially contaminated 
waters.  VX14VX is not expected to have a negative impact on vegetation.  It is toxic to fish, birds, and 
other wildlife.
VX07VX was synthesized and used by the Aum Shinrikyo organization in various attacks throughout 
Japan in the Nineties.  It is an exotic substance linked to terrorist activities.
Comments
Pass Through
VX01VX is a man-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent.  It is an odorless, 
tasteless, boily liquid that is amber in color.  Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of 
known chemical warefare agents.  They are similar to pesticides called organophosphates in how 
they work and what kinds of harmful effects are caused.  It was originally developed in the United 
Kingdom in the early 1950s and is not found naturally in the environment.  VX02It is stated that VX is 
produced in a manner very similar to that of modern phosphorous-based pesticides today, and 
therefore is extremely easy to manufacture.  Anyone creating modern pesticides could be secretly 
producing VX liquid.  VX03They are known to be stored by several nations, including the U.S.  VX09The 
U.S. stopped production and shipment of the chemical agent in the late 1960s.
http://www.milnet.com/chembio.htm
VX09According to an Ohio EPA study, VX at a level of 20 μg/L after 17.4 hours killed half of the striped 
bass exposed.  In light of this study and numerous other concerns, an agency toxicologist 'strongly 
recommended' against discharge of treated VX hydrolysate into the local POTW and waterbody until 
there was 'more information about the possible toxic effects of the treated hydrolysate discharge on 
aquatic life'.  VX08The estimated BCF is 8.
VX08If released into water, VX is expected to adsorb to suspended solids and sediment.  Based on its 
pKa, VX will exist in the protonated state in the environment and cations generally adsorb to organic 
carbon more readily.  Volatilization from water surfaces is not expected to be an important fate 
process.  It will decompose slowly by hydrolysis, particularly at low temperatures.  Recent 
experiments at 21°C, gave a pH independent hydrolytic half-life of 57 days.  Earlier results had 
indicated that the hydrolysis was base-catalyzed.  VX04The hydrolysis products of VX include EA2192, 
which is nearly as toxic as VX and is hydrolysed over 1,000 times more slowly.  Its solubility in water 
is 30 g/L at 25°C.
VX12For emergency situations, wear a "moon suit" consisting of a positive pressure, pressure-demand, 
full-facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or a pressure-demand supplied air 
respirator SCBA with escape cylinder in combination with a fully-encapuslating, chemical resistant suit
capable of maintaining a positive air pressure within the suit.  VX07Masks, including self-contained 
breathing apparatus masks, alone do not previde adequate protection against VX.
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/vx/basics/facts.asp
VX09The Chemical Weapons Convention requires destruction of chemical weapons by 2007.  The 
Army is proposing to pretreat stockpiles of VX nerve agent at its Newport Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility in Newport, Indiana, and then transport the resulting hydrolysate across the country to the 
DuPont Chambers Works facility at Carney's Point, Salem County, NJ for final treatment and disposal 
into the Delaware River.  VX10This DuPont facility is the largest commercial wastewater treatment 
facility in North America.  There, DuPont proposes to treat the wastewater from the neutralization of 
the VX nerve agent with a new patented wastewater treatment technology using powdered activated 
carbon.  VX11Limited pilot-scale testing has demonstrated the ability of supercritical water oxidation to 
achieve high destruction efficiencies for the organic constituents of VX hydrolysate.  VX04Oxidation 
using common bleach and superchlorinated bleach is also said to decontaminate.  VX04The estimated 
log Kow is 2.06.
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Table B.8.  Application of the Prioritization Framework to Cyanide Salts with respect to the Pass Through Endpoint 
Criterion
Weighting 
Factor Score
Availability 0.03 3
Potency 0.06 5
Persistence 0.16 4
Introduction/Dispersion 0.03 5
Process Removal 0.16 5
Storability 0.03 5
Outcomes 0.20 3
Public Perception 0.33 5
4.38
Comments: CY01
CY02
CY03
CY04
CY05
CY06
CY07 http://www.epa.gov/opprd001/factsheets
CY08 http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles
CY09 http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/cyanides.html
CY10 WCIT Profile for Sodium Cyanide
http://wwwatsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp8-c1-b.pdf
Whelton, A., Jensen, J., Richards, T., Val via, R., The Cyanic Threat,  Civil Engineering pgs 50-54, and 84.
Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens.  Second Edition.
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/mmg8.html
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts8.html
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0562.html
Composite Score
Can be stored in a dry place for extended periods.
CY04Cyanide salts are toxic to fish, but will not build up in their bodies.  Cyanide releases into surface 
waters will form hydrogen cyanide and evaporate.
Exotic substance linked to terrorist activities.
CY03Some of the cyanide salts will form hydrogen cyanide which will evaporate.  CY04One of the major 
sources of cyanides in natural waters is  from the discharges of industrial wastewater treatment 
facilities.  CY05Generally cyanic compounds do not readily dissolve in water and can be removed by 
sedimentation or filtration.  Free chlorination using hypochlorite will remove cyanide in water, if the pH 
is equal to or greater than 10; however if the pH is less than 10 the reaction may produce cyanogen 
chloride, which is sometimes considered even more toxic than molecular hydrogen cyanide.  Aeration 
conducted at room temperature on water with a pH level above 9.2 may be effective for removing 
hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride.  If the pH level is below 9.2, the cyanide removal efficiency 
will increase compared to higher pH values.  CY10Water can be treated to remove cyanide with 
chlorine combined with caustic, hypochlorite (for small quantities), or ozone.
Comments
Pass Through
CY07Not publicly available, CY10but quantities are readily available to contaminate wastewater systems.  
CY08Facilities in the U.S. producing sodium cyanide in 2005 include: Cyano Co. in Nevada and Du 
Pont Chemical Company in Tennessee. Cyanide substances also occur naturally in the fruits, seeds, 
roots and leaves of numerous plants, and cyanide is released to the environment from natural 
biogenic processes from higher plants, bacteria and fungi. Used as a pesticide and in mining, 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry.
CY09The adjusted oral LD50's for various mammals range from 14 mg/m
3 (13.2 mg/L) for rabbits to 56 
mg/m3 (52.8 mg/L) for mammals.
CY03Cyanide salts in surface water will form hydrogen cyanide.  The half life of hydrogen cyanide in the 
atmosphere is 1 to 3 years.  Most cyanides in water will form hydrogen cyanide and evaporate.   
Some cyanide in the water will be transformed into less harmful chemicals by microorganisms or will 
form a complex with metals such as iron.  CY05At pH values less than 9.2 most of the cyanide in water 
is present as hydrogen cyanide.
Easily introduced and dispersed into the wastewater collection and treatment system.  No special 
equipment is required to introduce or disperse the contaminant.
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APPENDIX C 
SCREENING TEST (PHASE I) RESULTS 
The following tables are the results of the screening tests for all the pathogens tested.  The results 
are reported by the number of positive results, or hits, per number of capillaries screened. 
 
Table C.1.  Bacillus anthracis screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/29/2006 0/4 
River Water 8/10/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/14/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/14/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/10/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.2.  Brucella spp. screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/29/2006 0/4 
River Water 8/10/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/14/2006 4/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/14/2006 2/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/10/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 3/4 
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 Table C.3.  Yersinia pestis screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/29/2006 0/4 
River Water 8/10/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/14/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/14/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/10/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.4.  F. tularensis screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/29/2006 0/4 
River Water 8/10/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/14/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/14/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/10/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/29/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.5.  Salmonella spp. screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/21/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/23/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/25/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/26/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 8/25/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 10/12/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.6.  E. coli O157 screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/21/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/23/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/25/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/26/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 8/25/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 10/12/2006 0/4 
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Table C.7.  L. monocytogenes screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/21/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/23/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/25/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/26/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 8/25/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 10/12/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.8.  Campylobacter spp. screening results 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/27/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/21/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/23/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 8/25/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 8/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 9/26/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 8/25/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 10/12/2006 0/4 
Table C.9.  C. botulinum Type A screening tests 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 9/14/2006 0/4 
River Water 9/14/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 9/14/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 9/14/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 9/14/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 11/9/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/14/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 11/9/2006 0/4 
 
Table C.10.  Cryptosporidium spp. screening tests 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 9/14/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 9/14/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 9/14/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 12/12/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 9/14/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 12/12/2006 0/4 
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Table C.11.  Variola screening tests 
Water Matrix 
Date 
Tested 
PCR 
Results 
Distilled Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
Finished Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
River Water 6/30/2006 0/4 
Primary Effluent 12/4/2006 0/4 
Mixed Liquor 12/4/2006 0/4 
Secondary Effluent 12/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated Filtered 
Water (2000 mL) 12/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated River 
Water (500 mL) 12/4/2006 0/4 
Concentrated 
Secondary Effluent 
(500 mL) 12/4/2006 0/4 
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